THE ROLE OF THE RUSSIAN NAVY IN RUSSIA'S EVOLVING APPROACH TO STRATEGIC DETERRENCE by Martz, Ashleigh G.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Theses and Dissertations 1. Thesis and Dissertation Collection, all items
2020-12
THE ROLE OF THE RUSSIAN NAVY IN RUSSIA'S
EVOLVING APPROACH TO STRATEGIC DETERRENCE
Martz, Ashleigh G.
Monterey, CA; Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/66679
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United
States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the
United States.








THE ROLE OF THE RUSSIAN NAVY  
IN RUSSIA’S EVOLVING APPROACH  
TO STRATEGIC DETERRENCE 
by 
Ashleigh G. Martz 
December 2020 
Thesis Advisor: Mikhail Tsypkin 
Second Reader: Michael W. Jones 
 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE  Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing 
instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of 
information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions 
for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson 
Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project 
(0704-0188) Washington, DC, 20503. 
 1. AGENCY USE ONLY 
(Leave blank)  
2. REPORT DATE 
 December 2020  
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
 Master’s thesis 
 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 
THE ROLE OF THE RUSSIAN NAVY IN RUSSIA’S EVOLVING 
APPROACH TO STRATEGIC DETERRENCE 
 5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
 
  
 6. AUTHOR(S) Ashleigh G. Martz 
 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5000 
 8. PERFORMING 
ORGANIZATION REPORT 
NUMBER 
 9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND 
ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
 10. SPONSORING / 
MONITORING AGENCY 
REPORT NUMBER 
 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the 
official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
 12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.  
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
 A 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)     
 Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia’s assessment of the changes in the strategic security 
environment has prompted an evolving approach to, and definition of, strategic deterrence and 
comprehensive military modernization to compete in such a dynamic environment. This thesis will explore 
Russia’s three distinct stages and approaches of strategic deterrence, starting in 1999 to the present day. It is 
from the influence of these approaches to strategic deterrence that Russia developed its corresponding 
security, defense, and military strategies, doctrines, and policies. This thesis focuses on the roles, utilization, 
and modernization efforts of the Russian Federation Navy (RFN) throughout each distinct stage. Russia 
currently regards the RFN as one of the most effective instruments of strategic deterrence. This thesis 
evaluates the effectiveness of the RFN across key Russian maritime domains: the Mediterranean Sea, the 
Black Sea, and the Arctic and Atlantic oceans. Many challenges prevent Russia from achieving the global 
naval notoriety it desires, and, for the foreseeable future, it relies on high-end cruise missiles and will direct 
naval operations in the maritime domains contiguous to Russia. 
 14. SUBJECT TERMS 
Russia, maritime, foreign policy, modernization, strategy, naval, navy, NATO, security, 
Russian, Russian Federation, fleet, Black Sea, Atlantic Ocean, Mediterranean Sea, Arctic 
Ocean, submarines, missiles, strategic deterrence, modernization, non-nuclear strategic 
weapon, security strategy, doctrine, state armament program, security strategy, Putin, 
deterrence, blue water, green water, SSGN, SSBN, patrol, Kalibr, budget, shipbuilding, 
defense, soviet 
 
 15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES 
 139 
 16. PRICE CODE 




 18. SECURITY 
CLASSIFICATION OF THIS 
PAGE 
Unclassified 








NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) 
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
i 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
ii 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
THE ROLE OF THE RUSSIAN NAVY IN RUSSIA’S EVOLVING APPROACH 
TO STRATEGIC DETERRENCE 
Ashleigh G. Martz 
Lieutenant, United States Navy 
BS, Indiana Wesleyan University, 2006 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES  
(EUROPE AND EURASIA) 
from the 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
December 2020 
Approved by: Mikhail Tsypkin 
 Advisor 
 Michael W. Jones 
 Second Reader 
 Afshon P. Ostovar 
 Associate Chair for Research 
 Department of National Security Affairs 
iii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
iv 
ABSTRACT 
 Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia’s assessment of the changes in the 
strategic security environment has prompted an evolving approach to, and definition of, 
strategic deterrence and comprehensive military modernization to compete in such a 
dynamic environment. This thesis will explore Russia’s three distinct stages and 
approaches of strategic deterrence, starting in 1999 to the present day. It is from the 
influence of these approaches to strategic deterrence that Russia developed its 
corresponding security, defense, and military strategies, doctrines, and policies. This 
thesis focuses on the roles, utilization, and modernization efforts of the Russian 
Federation Navy (RFN) throughout each distinct stage. Russia currently regards the RFN 
as one of the most effective instruments of strategic deterrence. This thesis evaluates the 
effectiveness of the RFN across key Russian maritime domains: the Mediterranean Sea, 
the Black Sea, and the Arctic and Atlantic oceans. Many challenges prevent Russia from 
achieving the global naval notoriety it desires, and, for the foreseeable future, it relies on 
high-end cruise missiles and will direct naval operations in the maritime domains 
contiguous to Russia. 
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A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia’s assessment of the changes in the 
strategic security environment has prompted an evolving approach to and definition of 
strategic deterrence and comprehensive military modernization efforts to compete in such 
an environment.1  Russia was left with ‘hollow’ conventional forces and had to rely on its 
nuclear deterrence to protect itself.2  However, throughout the past decade, Russia has 
concentrated on military modernization efforts and developing strategies to achieve their 
goals of regaining global recognition and respect as a ‘great power’ or regional hegemon, 
securing influence or authority over former Soviet republics, and depict itself as a “key 
regional powerbroker and a successful mediator…able to gain economic, military, and 
political influence over nations worldwide.”3   
This thesis seeks to examine and evaluate the role of the Russian Federation Navy 
(henceforth referred to as RFN) in Russia’s evolving policy and approach to strategic 
deterrence. Specifically, this thesis accepts the net assessment of the United States 
Intelligence Community that Russia’s definition and approach to strategic deterrence has 
evolved from defensive posture relying on nuclear deterrence to a concept that is both 
offensive and defensive and includes elements that are nuclear, non-nuclear, and 
 
1 Daniel Flynn, “Russia’s Evolving Approach to Strategic Deterrence” in Russia’s Strategic 
Intentions: A Strategic Multilayer Assessment White Paper (Boston, MA: NSI, Inc., 2019), 37, 
https://nsiteam.com/social/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/SMA-TRADOC-Russian-Strategic-Intentions-
White-Paper-PDF.pdf. 
2 Mikhail Tsypkin, “Gorbachev and the Soviet Military – The Military in Crisis, 1987–89” (lecture, 
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, February 19, 2020). In 1988, Gorbachev announced a unilateral 
cut of 800,000 troops. Mikhail Tsypkin, “Formation of the Russian Armed Forces; Military Politics; Wars 
in Chechnya (lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, February 19, 2020). After the dissolution 
of the Soviet Union, Russia’s population was cut in half and 40 percent of the industrial base was gone. 
There was a subsequent decline in defense procurement and privatization of the defense industry which, in 
a permanent fiscal crisis, did not produce. Minister of Defense, Marshal Igor Sergeyev (1997–2001) begins 
to cut 500,000 billets. 
3 Nicole Peterson, “Executive Summary” in Russia’s Strategic Intentions: A Strategic Multilayer 
Assessment White Paper (Boston, MA: NSI, Inc., 2019), vii, https://nsiteam.com/social/wp-content/
uploads/2019/05/SMA-TRADOC-Russian-Strategic-Intentions-White-Paper-PDF.pdf. This excerpt is the 
broad consensus of the goals of President Vladimir Putin’s global grand strategy. 
2 
informational based.4  This thesis will explore how Russian naval capabilities have altered 
in tandem with Russia’s changing definition and mission of strategic deterrence, and to 
determine if Russia’s codified deterrence strategy has actually influenced naval strategy 
and force modernization efforts. 
This thesis will discuss the National Security Strategy (NSS) and Military and 
Maritime Doctrine and Naval Policies of the Russian Federation that have been published 
in the last decade in order to compare strategic deterrence intentions, as codified in the 
above mentioned documents, with observed RFN’s modernization efforts and operations.5  
Furthermore, this thesis will explore the coercive, cross-domain or “new generation 
warfare” strategies of the Russian Federation and the RFN platforms, tactics, and weapons 
intended to achieve deterrence of U.S./NATO forces in the maritime domain and to provide 
insight into Russian naval operations and outlook.6   
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
This research will accomplish three specific tasks. First, it will explore how Russia 
defines strategic deterrence. It compares Russia’s past and current foreign policies and state 
armament programs to explain the Russian Federation’s evolving definition of strategic 
deterrence and to clarify how the Russian understanding of strategic deterrence differs from 
 
4 Flynn, “Russia’s Approach to Strategic Deterrence,” 37. 
5 Katri Pynnöniemi, “Russia’s National Security Strategy: Analysis of Conceptual Evolution,” The 
Journal of Slavic Military Studies 31, no. 2 (2018), https://doi.org/10.1080/13518046.2018.1451091; 
Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, (Moscow, Russia: The Kremlin, 2016), 
http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/
2542248; Russian Federation, Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation, trans. Anna Davis (Newport, 




VRrKmSFNMOj%2FNaRNawUoRdhdvpFJj7%2FpAkM%3D; Russian Federation, Fundamentals of the 
State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Naval Operations for the Period Until 2030, trans. 




hpd1ING%2FnmGQXqaH5%2FDEujDU76EnksAB%2B1A0%3D.   
6 Dmitry (Dima) Adamsky, “From Moscow with Coercion: Russian Deterrence Theory and Strategic 
Culture,” Journal of Strategic Studies 41, no. 1–2 (July 2017): 33–60. https://doi.org/10.1080/
01402390.2017.1347872.  
3 
the U.S. in theory and practice.7  Global strategic deterrence remains the primary mission 
of the Russian Federation but is relatively limited in the traditional enforcement of power 
projection.8   
Second, this thesis will analyze the role of strategic deterrence in the Russian 
military strategy in as far as it concerns the Russian navy. This thesis will also examine the 
effectiveness and implementation of deterrence strategies in Russia’s constrained fiscal 
environment and reduction in fleet sizes (largely due to Soviet platforms aging out). 
Further, this thesis will evaluate how the Russian naval modernization efforts, to date, 
reflect Russia’s approach to strategic deterrence. It will also explore the role of non-nuclear 
strategic weapons in deterrence and consider a possible outlook to for future RFN 
operations in support of strategic deterrence in specified operating areas. 
Third, this thesis will examine RFN operations since its sweeping modernization 
efforts by focusing on operational case studies in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea, the Black 
Sea, and certain areas of the Arctic/Atlantic Oceans. In these specific cases, this thesis will 
evaluate the effectiveness of the RFN to meet strategic deterrence goals which then informs 
future United States naval strategy and operations. Russia is a growing threat to the United 
States and its partners and allies. As declared in the United States National Security 
Strategy,  
Russia aims to weaken U.S. influence in the world and divide us from our 
allies and partners… is investing in new military capabilities, including 
 
7 Julian Cooper, Russia’s State Armament Programme to 2020: A Quantitative Assessment of 




a-quantitative-assessment-of-implementation-2011-2015-FOI-Report.pdf; Richard Connolly and Mathieu 
Boulègue, Russia’s New State Armament Programme: Implications for the Russian Armed Forces and 
Military Capabilities to 2027 (London, England: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2018), 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/russia-s-new-state-armament-programme-implications-russian-
armed-forces-and-military/2018-05-10-russia-state-armament-programme-connolly-boulegue-final.pdf; 
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard, “Russian Strategic Deterrence,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 58, no. 4 
(July 2016): 7–26, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2016.1207945. 
8 Dmitry Gorenburg, Russia’s Naval Strategy in the Mediterranean, ISSN 1867–4119 (Garmisch-




nuclear systems that remain the most significant existential threat to the 
United States…combination of Russian ambition and growing military 
capabilities creates an unstable frontier in Eurasia, where the risk of conflict 
due to Russian miscalculation is growing…and continues to intimidate its 
neighbors with threatening behavior, such as nuclear posturing and the 
forward deployment of offensive capabilities.9 
The significance of this research, therefore, is to examine the efficiency of the 
Russian navy in regard to its mission of strategic deterrence. This thesis aims to enable a 
better understanding of how effective the Russian navy is in implementing strategic 
deterrence and to highlight how the RFN best exercises its forces in a limited budget 
environment, to maximize lethality, and maintain the global competitive edge. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review will discuss primary sources and academic literature on 
Russia’s approach to strategic deterrence. Primary sources include the texts of the Russian 
military and maritime doctrines as well as pronouncements by President Putin and 
members of his military high command regarding their intentions for the use of the RFN 
including non-nuclear strategic weapons in deterrence. There is also a considerable body 
of Western academic and military professional literature discussing the Russian approach 
to strategic deterrence and operations of the Russian navy. 
The concept of deterrence emerged during the Cold War in the United States and 
Western Europe. Deterrence, as defined by the United States Department of Defense, is 
“the prevention of action by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction 
and/or a belief that the cost outweighs the perceived gains.”10  Thomas Schelling suggested 
in his classical work Arms and Influence, that the threat of force can be used to compel an 
adversary to change its behavior—“compelling involves the actual use of force, with the 
 
9 White House, National Security Strategy, (Washington, DC: White House, 2017), 25 and 47, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf.  
10 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operations, JP 3-0 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018), xx, 
https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_0ch1.pdf?ver=2018-11-27-160457-910.  
5 
implicit or explicit threat of more to come, until the adversary changes its behavior.”11  To 
this effect, when explaining U.S. Naval deterrence operations, this thesis will use the 
combined strategies of deterrence and compellence as the running definition, as the two 
work in concert with and can supplement each other in practice.12   
Strategic deterrence has been defined by Paul Nitze and J.H. McCall as “our will 
and ability to wield military power to prevent or inhibit the use of force by another state in 
a manner of which we disapprove.”13  During the Cold War, strategic deterrence has been 
specifically associated with deterring nuclear threats in a bipolar world, with the United 
States and the Soviet Union being the two actors. This view also appears in the current 
National Security Strategy which calls for “deterrence to be extended across all of these 
domains and must address all possible strategic attacks.”14  As testified by former 
Commander, United States Strategic Command, General John E. Hyten to the Senate 
Armed Services Committee, “strategic deterrence in the 21st century is more than 
nuclear…the global security environment we operate in has changed; our adversaries are 
developing advanced nuclear and conventional weaponry that rivals our systems in 
capability and capacity.”15  Just as contended by the great military strategist, Carl von 
Clausewitz, “many roads lead to success, and…they do not all involve the opponent’s 
outright defeat; they range from m the destruction of the enemy’s forces, the conquest of 
his territory, to temporary occupation or invasion, to projects with an immediate political 
purpose, and finally to passively awaiting the enemy’s attacks; anyone of these may be 
 
11 Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), 72 and 
Michael Gerson and Daniel Whiteneck, Deterrence and Influence: The Navy’s Role in Preventing War, 
CRM D0019315.A4 (Arlington, VA: CNA, Corp, 2009), https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/
D0019315.A4.pdf.  
12 Gerson and Whiteneck, Deterrence and Influence, 23. 
13 Paul H. Nitze, and J.H. McCall, National Research Council, Division on Engineering and Physical 
Sciences, Mathematics Commission on Physical Sciences, and Naval Studies Board, “Appendix B: 
Contemporary Strategic Deterrence and Precision-Guided Munitions,” Post-Cold War Conflict Deterrence, 
(Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 1997), 76, https://www.nap.edu/read/5464/chapter/7. 
14 White House, National Security Strategy, 27. 
15 Hearing to Receive Testimony on United States Strategic Command Programs, United States 
Senate, 115th Cong (April 4, 2017), (statement of John E. Hyten, Commander, United States Strategic 
Command Before the Senate Committee on Armed Services) 9, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/
imo/media/doc/17-31_04-04-17.pdf.  
6 
used to overcome the enemy’s will: the choice depends on circumstances,” the United 
States must adapt its strategy to reflect current reality.16  
Deterrence theory grew out of the realist school of thought regarding foreign policy 
and international relations and balance of power politics.17  It is widely accepted that 
President Vladimir Putin is a fundamentally cautious, hard-headed realist and, therefore, 
approaches foreign policy and military strategy from a realist perspective.18  The experts 
who discuss and evaluate Russian foreign policy tend to believe that realism is the most 
fruitful approach for understanding Russia’s conduct in international relations.19  This 
realist perspective, that has formed Russia’s threat perceptions, provides the basis for the 
Kremlin’s doctrines and policies (to be discussed below).20 
According to Kristin Ven Bruusgaard, the Russian definition of deterrence since 
the Cold War and the Russian approach to deterrence was and is almost certainly tied to 
their military (conventional and nuclear) capabilities and/or shortcomings.21  Moreover, 
she explains that since the end of the Cold War, the Russian approach to deterrence can be 
identified in distinct stages up to the present day: 
1. First Stage: Theory of De-escalation (Emerged in 1999) – Russian 
response on how to deter U.S. airpower, precision-strike capability, and 
conventional weapons with Russian nuclear weapons. 
 
16 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 94. 
17 Frank C. Zagare, “Classical Deterrence Theory: A Critical Assessment,” International Interactions 
21, no. 4 (August 1995): 365–387, https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629608434873.  
18 John Schindler, “Russian Activities Across Europe (A Contrarian Assessment)” in Russia’s 
Strategic Intentions: A Strategic Multilayer Assessment White Paper (Boston, MA: NSI, Inc., 2019), 46, 
https://nsiteam.com/social/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/SMA-TRADOC-Russian-Strategic-Intentions-
White-Paper-PDF.pdf. 
19 Alexander Sergunin, Explaining Russian Foreign Policy Behavior: Theory and Practice (Stuttgart, 
Germany: Ibidem-Verlag Press, 2016), 27, https://pure.spbu.ru/ws/files/28351678/
explaining_Russian_foreign_policy.pdf.  
20 Segunin, Explaining Russian Foreign Policy Behavior, 205–210. 
21 Ven Bruusgaard, “Russian Strategic Deterrence,” 7–10. 
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2. Second Stage: Russian “Strategic Deterrence” (Theory throughout the 
2000s) – Using a combination of nuclear and conventional weapons to 
effectively deter U.S./western convention and nuclear threats. 
3. Third Stage: Expanded Strategic Deterrence (2010s to Present Day) – 
Inclusion of non-nuclear and non-military to further conventional and non-
traditional security threats.22 
At present day, as stated by the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, Strategic 
Deterrence is defined as: 
A coordinated system of military and non-military (political, diplomatic, 
legal, economic, ideological, scientific–technical and others) measures 
taken consecutively or simultaneously…with the goal of deterring military 
action entailing damage of a strategic character…Strategic deterrence is 
directed at the stabilization of the military–political situation…in order to 
influence an adversary within a predetermined framework, or for the de-
escalation of military conflict…The objects to be influenced through 
strategic deterrence may be the military–political leadership and the 
population of the potential adversary state (or coalition of 
states)…Strategic-deterrent measures are carried out continuously, both in 
peacetime and in wartime.23 
This thesis will use these definitions in order to analyze and evaluate Russia’s National 
Security Strategy and military strategies, rhetoric regarding RFN modernization and 
operations, as well as observed RFN operations. 
The current Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, approved by 
President Vladimir Putin on November 30, 2016, explicitly indicates that Russia seeks to 
assert itself as a “center of influence” in what it characterizes as a multipolar international 
system.24  Further assertions in the Russian Foreign Policy Concept also provide insight 
into Putin’s perspective of the global strategic environment, specifically alluding to an 
 
22 Ven Bruusgaard, “Russian Strategic Deterrence,” 9. 
23 Ven Bruusgaard, “Russian Strategic Deterrence,” 10–11 and Ministry of Defense of the Russian 
Federation, Military Encyclopedic Dictionary “Strategic Deterrence,” accessed February 16, 2020, 
translation provided by Yandex Translate, http://encyclopedia.mil.ru/encyclopedia/dictionary/
details.htm?id=14206@morfDictionary.  
24 Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation. 
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alleged global power disparity, and rising international tensions, these circumstances 
require Russia to play an instrumental role in eliminating such disparities and tensions and 
also provide strategic stability in the shifting political landscape.25  These ever-present 
themes of realpolitik and Balance of Power are further obvious in associated strategies and 
will be discussed further as the theoretical approach to Russian strategies and naval 
operations. 
Russia’s National Security Strategy (NSS2015), approved in 2015 ahead of the 
Foreign Policy Concept, provides some insight into the capabilities and security 
perceptions that drive Russian strategic thinking. NSS2015, Article 6 defines Russia’s 
Foreign Policy Concept which is Russia’s contemporary understandings of “national 
security…national interests…threats to national security…strategic national 
priorities…measures aimed to counter threats…and a system safeguarding national 
security.”26  Experts differ regarding the importance of NSS2015. Vasiliy Zatsepin, a 
Russian specialist in national security and defense economics, argues that NSS2015 is a 
“declaratory document which poorly correlates with the reality” and should not necessarily 
be deemed reliable for guiding future military action.27  In contrast, Katri Pynnöniemi 
contends that NSS2015 offers a rather realistic perspective to Russia’s security and its 
defensive posture even though it follows the 2008 Russian incursion into Georgia and the 
2014 annexation of Crimea.28  NSS2015 asserts “an increase in the Russian Federation’s 
role in resolving the most important international problems, settling military conflicts, and 
ensuring strategic stability and the supremacy of international law in interstate relations,” 
lending claims to the Russian’s key role.29  This approach to National Security was 
 
25 Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation. 
26 Russian Federation’s National Security Strategy (Moscow, Russia: The Kremlin, 2015), 2–3, 
http://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/OtrasPublicaciones/Internacional/2016/Russian-National-Security-
Strategy-31Dec2015.pdf.  
27 Vasiliy Zatsepin, “On a New Version of the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation,” 
Russian Economic Developments, Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy, 2 (February 2016): 85, 
https://www.iep.ru/files/RePEc/gai/recdev/682Zatsepin.pdf.  
28 Katri Pynnöniemi, “Russia’s National Security Strategy: Analysis of Conceptual Evolution,” 242.  
29 Russian Federation National Security Strategy, 3. 
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resonant in 2012 when then Prime Minister Putin exclaimed, “we should not tempt anyone 
by allowing ourselves to be weak…is for this reason that we will under no circumstances 
surrender our strategic deterrent capability, and indeed, will in fact strengthen it,” which 
was an obvious signal to both domestic and foreign audiences regarding Russia’s view of 
the strategic global environment and Russia’s strategic deterrence.30 
The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, approved by President Putin on 
December 25, 2014, codifies the main tasks of the Russia military and “is aimed at 
deterring and preventing military conflicts, improving military organization and forms and 
methods of employment of the Armed Forces, other troops and bodies, and enhancing 
mobilization readiness in order to ensure defense and security of the Russian Federation, 
as well as interests of its allies” and implements the National Security Strategy.31   The 
Military Doctrine, without naming the United States directly, identifies the external threats 
to the Russian Federation as:  
Build-up of the power potential of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO)… deployment (build-up) of military contingents of foreign states 
(groups of states) in the territories of the states contiguous with the Russian 
Federation and its allies, as well as in adjacent waters, including for exerting 
political and military pressure on the Russian Federation… establishment 
and deployment of strategic missile defense systems undermining global 
stability and violating the established balance of forces related to nuclear 
missiles, implementation of the global strike concept… as well as 
deployment of strategic non-nuclear systems of high-precision weapons.32 
The RFN’s specific tasks are delineated in Articles 32–34 of the Military Doctrine 
as part of the larger directive to the Russian Armed Forces. In addition to the general tasks 
of defending and protecting sovereignty and Russian territory, the RFN is assigned with 
strategic deterrence, combatting piracy and safety of navigation, security of economic 
activity on the high seas, and the protection of Russian interests in the Arctic.33  It is these 
 
30 Vladimir Putin, “Being Strong: National Security Guarantees for Russia,” Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 
February 20, 2012, http://archive.premier.gov.ru/eng/events/news/18185/.  
31 The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, (Moscow, Russia: The Kremlin, 2014), 
https://rusemb.org.uk/press/2029.  
32 The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, Article 2. 
33 The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, Articles 32–34. 
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tasks that are set forth in the Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation 
in the Field of Naval Operations for the Period Until 2030, which underscores the use of 
the RFN in support of national interests.  
In 2017, Vladimir Putin approved The Russian Federation in the Field of Naval 
Operations for the Period Until 2030 (hereinafter referred to as Russian Naval Policy) after 
the largest RFN modernization efforts were fielded and put to sea. The Russian Naval 
Policy provides direction for RFN operations of blue- and green-water platforms, including 
the new nuclear and non-nuclear weapons and capabilities and, most important, codifies 
that “the Russian Federation will not allow significant superiority of naval forces of other 
states over its Navy and will strive to secure its position as the second most combat capable 
Navy in the world.”34  The Russian Naval Policy outlines general provisions for the RFN, 
which includes the identification of risks and threats to Russian national security, and 
codifies RFN goals, objectives, and priorities, as any naval policy typically does. Putin’s 
Russian Naval Policy also has specific guidance on the use of the RFN as an effective 
instrument of strategic deterrence.35  For the purpose of analyzing and assessing the role 
of the RFN in Russia’s evolving approach to strategic deterrence, the literature review will 
focus on this particular section of the Russian Naval Policy. 
According to Russian Naval Policy, the RFN is regarded as “one of the most 
effective instruments of strategic (nuclear and nonnuclear) deterrence, including 
preventing global strike.”36  The alleged ability of the RFN to project a presence across the 
world’s oceans and its possession of an arsenal of strategic nuclear and conventional, high-
precision weapons has afforded the RFN a “qualitatively new objective” to destroy vital 
enemy military and economic facilities and infrastructure from the sea.37  The section 
 
34 Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Naval Operations for the 
Period Until 2030, 13.  
35 Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Naval Operations for the 
Period Until 2030, 11. 
36 Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Naval Operations for the 
Period Until 2030, 11. 
37 Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Naval Operations for the 
Period Until 2030, 12. 
11 
regarding strategic deterrence implicitly identifies key maritime domains in which the RFN 
shall secure a permanent naval presence and “implement strategic deterrence”: the Black 
Sea (with special attention on maintaining control of the Crimean Peninsula), the 
Mediterranean Sea, the Arctic, and vital sea lines of communication.38  Further, the 
Russian Naval Policy is explicit in alleging that the U.S. global strike capabilities are 
directly threatening Russian security.39 It is through this lens that this thesis will evaluate, 
analyze, and gauge effectiveness of key RFN operations and weapons since modernization 
and policy efforts took effect. 
Several academic evaluations of the Russian Naval Policy have identified 
constraints in the implementation and feasibility of the Russian government’s lofty 
declarations. It has been noted that the Russian Naval Policy was approved ahead of the 
finalization of the current State Armament Program (SAP). Evaluation of the Naval Policy 
has been characterized as “yet another salvo in the ongoing rearguard action by the Russian 
Navy to protect its procurement budget.”40  SAP has projections through 2025 and calls 
for supplementing conventional Russian naval forces with hypersonic missiles and 
torpedoes, but internal production problems and a decline in economic prosperity make 
these aspirations mostly unattainable by 2025.41  This sentiment is further echoed in late-
2019 rhetoric from President Putin to senior officials in the Defense Ministry and defense 
industry executives. Putin said that RFN’s core fleet of ships carry the Kalibr high-
precision long-range missiles, make up the strategic non-nuclear forces, and that fulfillment 
of the current SAP would double the Kalibr arsenal by 2023. Moreover, he emphasized the 
need to expand naval capabilities by upgrading surface combatants and subsurface units 
 
38 Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Naval Operations for the 
Period Until 2030, 12. 
39 Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Naval Operations for the 
Period Until 2030, 11. 
40 Dmitry Gorenburg, “Russia’s New and Unrealistic Naval Doctrine,” War on the Rocks, last 
modified July 26, 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/07/russias-new-and-unrealistic-naval-doctrine/.  
41 Gorenburg, “Russia’s New and Unrealistic Naval Doctrine.” 
12 
with hypersonic weapons.42  Yet, analysis of SAP-2020, in which the RFN received 
twenty-six percent of the ten-year budget, revealed RFN shipbuilding goals far behind 
schedule (ex.:12 of 24 submarines built; 16 of 54 surface ships built); with the new SAP-
2027, the RFN is expected to receive a smaller share of a more constrained defense budget, 
forcing RFN leadership to combine blue- and green-water capabilities, which will limit 
where, when, and how effectively RFN units can operate.43 
An examination of RFN operations, for this thesis, will encompass 2008–2019 (the 
time period in which SAP-2020 and current Russian strategies, doctrines, and policies were 
in place) and center on the maritime domains specifically listed in the current Russian 
Naval Policy: Black Sea, Arctic (to include northern and Eastern Atlantic), and 
Mediterranean Sea operations. For the purposes of this thesis, the Pacific and Baltic Sea 
regions will not be discussed as to focus on the primary U.S. and NATO maritime operating 
areas. 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
Russia undertook a massive naval modernization effort that was protracted by 
shipbuilding and declining budget. As the realities of unmet modernization goals and 
legacy Soviet platforms nearing de-commissioning combined with the changing global 
strategic environment, Russia’s perceived threats to security, stability, and national 
interests seem more dire to Russian leaders. The desire to become a power player has 
continued to drive Russia’s approach to strategic deterrence, but the desire is inhibited by 
budget constraints, poor shipbuilding, corrupt business practices, and shortcomings in 
innovation and military technology. It is likely Russia will refine strategy and/or 
operational doctrine to reflect current capabilities, use weapons in a broader manner to 
 
42  Vladimir Putin, “Meeting with senior Defence Ministry officials and defence industry executives - 
The President held a meeting on the implementation of the state defence order for the Navy,” President of 
Russia, last modified December 3, 2017, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/62228 and Vladimir 
Putin, “Meeting with senior Defence Ministry officials and defence industry executives - The President 
opened a series of meetings on the current state and development prospects of the Russian Navy,” President 
of Russia, last modified December 2, 2017, http://en.special.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/62175. 
43 Connolly and Boulègue, Russia’s New State Armament Programme: Implications for the Russian 
Armed Forces and Military Capabilities to 2027. 
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achieve or maintain a perceived status quo, and strain U.S. and NATO maritime assets in 
a manner that befits Russia. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This research will have four main components:  
1. It will examine and define Russian strategic deterrence and how this has 
evolved to include offensive and defensive operations and various nuclear 
and non-nuclear weapons to achieve the intended deterrence.  
2. It will explore the current Russian security strategy, military doctrine, and 
naval policy to assess how the RFN can flex hard power to achieve 
strategic deterrence as required by the Russian military strategy.  
3. It will also analyze RFN operations in the Black Sea, Mediterranean Sea, 
Arctic and western/northern Atlantic to determine if and how the RFN 
assets are achieving desired deterrence and, if so, how effectively.  
4. It will attempt to assess what the future holds for the RFN as Soviet 
platforms are de-commissioned and Russia’s military budget stagnates or 
declines. This thesis also seeks to provide an outlook for future Russian 
naval operations in order to support the Russian mission of strategic 
deterrence. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW  
In order to adequately address the questions and significance of this research the 
structure and use of a standard format will be crucial. The first and second chapters will 
trace Russia’s definitions and approach to strategic deterrence since the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and define what Russian strategic deterrence is today. The third chapter will 
examine Russian security, military, and naval doctrines to assess how the RFN is to be 
utilized in strategic deterrence and the force modernization efforts to achieve deterrence 
goals. The fourth chapter will examine geographic area case studies to determine how and 
if RFN assets are effectively achieving strategic deterrence goals. The final chapter will 
14 
also include an analysis of the Russian navy as an instrument of strategic deterrence and 
provide an outlook for future naval operations. 
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II. RUSSIA’S EVOLVING APPROACH TO STRATEGIC 
DETERRENCE 
A. INTRODUCTION  
This chapter introduces the evolution of Russia’s approach to, and definition of, 
strategic deterrence since the end of the Cold War. The main purpose of this chapter is to 
examine Russia’s historic approaches to strategic deterrence since the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and how these approaches have contributed to the current definition of, and 
approach to, strategic deterrence. This chapter will work through three distinct stages of, 
and approaches to, strategic deterrence and subsequent key security and defense 
documents. For each stage, this thesis will examine Russian naval administration and 
activities throughout the first two stages (Chapter IV will cover the third stage). Further, 
this chapter will define Russia’s current approach to strategic deterrence and will consider 
this definition throughout an examination of Russia’s key national security and military 
documents. 
The stages of strategic deterrence on which this thesis relies were researched and 
posited by political scientist Kristin Ven Bruusgaard; she identifies that the Russian 
definition of and approach to deterrence since the Cold War was and is almost certainly 
tied to their military (conventional and nuclear) capabilities and/or shortcomings.44  
Moreover, she explains that since the end of the Cold War, the Russian approach to 
deterrence can be identified in distinct stages up to the present day: 
1. First Stage: Theory of De-escalation (Emerged in 1999) – Russian 
response on how to deter U.S. airpower, precision-strike capability, and 
conventional weapons with Russian nuclear weapons. 
2. Second Stage: Russian strategic deterrence (Theory throughout the 2000s) 
– Using a combination of nuclear and conventional weapons to effectively 
deter U.S./western convention and nuclear threats. 
 
44 Kristin Ven Bruusgaard, “Russian Strategic Deterrence,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 58, 
no. 4 (July 2016): 7–10, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2016.1207945,” 7–10. 
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3. Third Stage: Expanded strategic deterrence (2010s to Present Day) – 
Inclusion of non-nuclear and non-military components to further deter 
conventional and non-traditional security threats.45 
B. THEORY OF DE-ESCALATION APPROACH TO STRATEGIC 
DETERRENCE (1999–2000) 
By 1999, six years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the post-Soviet Russia 
military doctrine was more or less a continuation of the Soviet perspective. Following the 
Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia was left with ‘hollow’ conventional 
forces that had to rely heavily on nuclear deterrence capabilities to protect itself and contain 
security threats.46  This approach to strategic deterrence is rooted in a ‘Theory of De-
escalation (of Conflict).’  The disrepair and abhorrent state of the military led to Russian 
military officers and analysts, in May 1999, suggesting the use of nuclear weapons on the 
battlefield and/or for use in deterring aggression and ensuring Russian security. In the 
article “On the Use of Nuclear Weapons to De-Escalate Hostilities” published in the 
Russian General Staff journal, Voennaia Mysl (translated to Military Thought), the authors 
argued that, due to Russia’s current weakened economic and military state, its nuclear 
 
45 Ven Bruusgaard, “Russian Strategic Deterrence,” 9. 
46 Mikhail Tsypkin, “Gorbachev and the Soviet Military – The Military in Crisis, 1987–89” (lecture, 
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, February 19, 2020). In 1988, Gorbachev announced a unilateral 
cut of 800,000 troops. Mikhail Tsypkin, “Formation of the Russian Armed Forces; Military Politics; Wars 
in Chechnya (lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, February 19, 2020). After the dissolution 
of the Soviet Union, Russia’s population was cut in half and 40 percent of the industrial base was gone. 
There was a subsequent decline in defense procurement and privatization of the defense industry which, in 
a permanent fiscal crisis, did not produce. Minister of Defense, Marshal Igor Sergeyev (1997–2001) begins 
to cut 500,000 billets. And Ven Bruusgaard, “Russian Strategic Deterrence,” 9. 
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weapons would serve in deterring conventional and nuclear attacks.47  The Russian 
military officers and analysts described the concept of de-escalation of military operations 
as: 
Fulfilling the de-escalation concept is understood to mean actually using 
nuclear weapons both for showing resolve as well as for the immediate 
delivery of nuclear strikes against the enemy….It seems to us that the 
cessation of military operations will be the  most acceptable thing for the 
enemy in this case.48 
This concept presumed that a “first-strike” or “demonstrative strikes” made by a few 
Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW) against unpopulated and low-collateral 
targets in the enemy’s deep rear of the battlefield would cause the enemy to pause and 
consider increased hostilities and/or nuclear escalation.49   
Essentially, this concept was meant to codify the use or threat of use of NSNW for 
deterring and/or de-escalating a conventional threat or conflict.50  As this argument was 
made, President Boris Yeltsin’s “Main Provisions of the Military Doctrine” (adopted in 
November 1993), were still in effect. Yeltsin’s Main Provisions were henceforth described 
 
47 V.I. Levshin, A.V. Nedinn, and M.E. Sosnovski, “On the Use of Nuclear Weapons to De-Escalate 
Hostilities,” Military Thought no. 3 (1999): 34–37, http://militaryarticle.ru/zarubezhnoe-voennoe-
obozrenie/1999-zvo/8995-o-primenenii-jadernogo-oruzhija-dlja-dejeskalacii. The Voennaia Mysl (Military 
Thought) journal is the official journal of the Russian General Staff. The main contributors to this journal 
are senior officers and military academics, as well as some key members of the country’s military 
leadership, including former chiefs of General Staff. (Information provided by Kristin Ven Bruusgaard’s 
“Russian Strategic Deterrence,” page 8.) “U.S. analysts widely accept Military Thought as a bellwether for 
Russia’s military-strategic discourse. The journal’s articles generally reliably reveal how Russia’s senior 
military strategists assess the strategic environment, evaluate military doctrinal and other options, and craft 
recommendations to advance their nation’s strategic interests. Importantly, the ideas found in Military 
Thought often inform final policy decisions in the Kremlin. But the journal is not itself a perfect predictor 
of changes to Russian military policy. The Russian uniformed military lacks the authority to unilaterally 
implement the doctrinal changes reviewed or even widely endorsed in Military Thought. That authority is 
left to the Russian Federation’s political leaders, many of whose views are not represented in the journal” 
(Alexander Velez-Green, The Unsettling View from Moscow, 6). 
48 Mark Schneider, The Nuclear Forces and Doctrine of the Russian Federation (Fairfax, VA: 
National Institute Press, 2006), 20, https://www.nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Russian-nuclear-
doctrine-NSF-for-print.pdf. 
49 Yury E. Fedorov, New Wine in Old Bottles? The New Salience of Nuclear Weapons, Report 
Number ISBN: 978–2-86592-230-7 (Paris, France: Ifri Security Studies Center, Fall 2007), 18, 
https://inis.iaea.org/collection/NCLCollectionStore/_Public/42/081/42081738.pdf.  
50 Mikhail Tsypkin, “Russian Strategic Deterrence” (lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 
CA, February 26, 2020).  
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as the “first attempt in Soviet/Russian history to develop a military doctrine setting out 
current officially accepted viewpoints on how to prevent war, on the purposes and nature 
of war, and, if prevention fails, on how to prepare the military for war and how to conduct 
it.”51  Therefore, the concept of de-escalation, as posited by Yeltsin, envisioned that use or 
threatening the use of nuclear weapons in a conventional conflict demonstrated resolve and 
credibility, and would be the appropriate mechanism to convince an adversary to stand 
down.52  This proposal introduced in Voennaia Mysl then principally worked within the 
parameters of Yeltsin’s “Main Provisions” but suggested nuclear steps of de-escalation 
based on an adaptation of nuclear analyst Hermann Kahn’s ‘escalation ladder’.53  Nikolai 
Sokov, in his presentation “Russian Nuclear Strategy: Background, Current Status, Future” 
characterized the transition of Russia’s 1993 military and nuclear doctrines to the 1999–











51 Vladimir Belous, “Key Aspects of the Russian Nuclear Strategy,” Security Dialogue 28, no. 2 (June 
1997): 159–160, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26296523.  
52 Olga Oliker and Andrey Baklitskiy, “The Nuclear Posture Review and Russian ‘De-Escalation:’ A 
Dangerous Solution to a Nonexistent Problem,” War on the Rocks, last modified February 20, 2018, 
https://warontherocks.com/2018/02/nuclear-posture-review-russian-de-escalation-dangerous-solution-
nonexistent-problem/.  
53 Sergey Brezkun, “Russia needs a “ladder” not of escalation but of de-escalation,” Независимое 
военное обозрение (translated: Independent Military Review), November 27, 2015, http://nvo.ng.ru/
concepts/2015-11-27/1_stairway.html.  
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Table 1. Transition from Soviet to Russian Nuclear and Military 
Strategies54 
Transition from Soviet to Russian Nuclear and Military Strategies 
  Soviet Union/Russian  1993 Doctrines 
Russian 2000  
and Later Doctrines 
Nature of 




Missions Deterrence of Global War 
De-Escalation of Regional War 
Deterrence of Global War 
Employment 
No First Use 
Massive Strike on Warning of 
Attack; Transition to Second 
Strike 
Regional Conflict: Limited Use,  
     Military Targets 
First Use 
Massive Strike on Warning of Attack; 
Transition to Second Strike 
Scale of Use Unacceptable Damage Tailored Damage for Limited Use Unacceptable Damage for Global War 
 
Furthermore, the authors of the 1999 “On the Use of Nuclear Weapons to De-
Escalate Hostilities” married types of non-strategic nuclear strikes to targets that would 
ideally achieve de-escalation and deterrence (Table 2). However, as explained by Olga 
Oliker and Andrey Baklitskiy, this kind of de-escalation deterrence is only effective if the 
adversary understands they are the adversary and further understands what actions or 






54 Source: Nikolai Sokov, “Russian Nuclear Strategy: Background, Current Status, Future” 
(presentation, Center for Strategic and International Studies Headquarters, Washington, D.C., USA, June 
27, 2016), https://www.csis.org/events/russian-nuclear-strategy and https://www.nonproliferation.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/Nikolai-Sokov-Russian-Nuclear-Strategy.pdf.  
55 Oliker and Baklitskiy, “The Nuclear Posture Review and Russian ‘De-Escalation.” 
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Table 2. Original De-Escalation of Armed Conflicts Concept56 
Original De-Escalation of Armed Conflicts Concept 
By Levshin, Nedelin, and Sosnovsky (May 1999) 
TYPE OF STRIKE TARGET TYPE 
Demonstration Single strike in area with no or very few personnel 
Intimidation - Demonstration Single strike at logistics, engineering, reduction of invading force/enemy efficiency 
Intimidation 
More than one strike aimed at a sector of the 
conflict to alter the balance and/or to eliminate 
breakthrough 
Intimidation - Retaliation 
Multiple strikes on enemy’s theater of  
operation’s force groups, to fundamentally or 
resolutely alter the balance and prevent  
breakthrough of a defensive line 
Retaliation - Intimidation Mass strikes on enemy armed forces to rout and destroy — a radical change is the goal 
 
1. Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons  
For the purposes of this thesis, I will be working with the accepted descriptions of 
non-strategic nuclear weapons (also referred to as tactical nuclear weapons) as provided 
from the United States Congressional Research Service (CRS) report Nonstrategic Nuclear 
Weapons (updated May 4, 2020).   
Tactical Use of Nuclear Weapons: the use of nuclear weapons by land, 
sea, or air  forces  against opposing forces, supporting installations or 
facilities, in support of  operations that contribute to the 
accomplishment of a military mission of limited scope,  or in support 
of the military commander’s scheme of maneuver, usually limited to the 
area of military operations.57  
Therefore, the nuclear weapons not covered by strategic arms control treaties are to be 
consequently considered as nonstrategic nuclear weapons.58  As argued in the CRS report, 
 
56 Source: Thomas C. Moore, “Tailor-Surgeon, Soviet and Silovik: Russian Nuclear Strategy,” Revue 
Défense Nationale, no. 801 (June 2017), 47, https://www.cairn.info/revue-defense-nationale-2017-6-page-
42.htm.  
57 Amy F. Woolf, Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons, CRS Report No. RL32572 (Washington, D.C.: 
Congressional Research Service, May 4, 2020), 8, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL32572.pdf.  
58 Woolf, Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons, 9. 
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defining what a NSNW based on specific weapon capabilities is not the most precise 
method to use when classifying a nuclear weapon to its intended use.59  Ultimately, the 
distinction between a strategic and NSNW, therefore, indicates not the yield or delivery 
system of the nuclear warhead, but the nature of the target.60 
2. Russian Federation Navy (1999–2000) 
Since the 1999 Russian de-escalation approach to strategic deterrence was designed 
more to rely on its nuclear rather than conventional military strength, the RFN was 
employed, or rather not employed, as such. To highlight the significant decline in RFN 
platforms and combat capability, in the ten years following the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union, the RFN a decline in half of its bases and personnel, as well as 41 percent of its 
ships and submarines and 63 percent of its fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft; the total naval 
order of battle (NOB) was reduced by one-third, and 90 percent of RFN ships and 
submarines were in need of repair.61  Furthermore, the RFN was never designed to fulfill 
the NSNW strategic approach.62   
Operationally, the RFN was grossly neglected between 1999 and 2000. “In 2000, 
the navy exercised even less than in 1999: 195 (in 1999–315) missile firings and 368 
(1999–934) anti-submarine warfare (ASW)/minesweeping exercises” … average at-sea 
time was 6.4 days per ship, and 156 of 584 naval aircrew were combat-ready, and 77 of the 
156 were night flight qualified.63  The General Staff’s de-escalation approach to strategic 
deterrence meant no demand for conventional naval forces. Regarding RFN’s nuclear-
 
59 Woolf, Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons, 8–9. 
60 Woolf, 10. 
61 Mikhail Tsypkin, “Rudderless in a Storm: The Russian Navy, 1992–2002,” in Russian Military 
Reform: 1992–2002, ed. Anne C. Aldis and Roger N. McDermott (London, England: Frank Cass 
Publishers, 2003), 161. 
62 Michael Kofman, “The Role of Nuclear Forces in Russian Maritime Strategy,” in The Future of the 
Undersea Deterrent: A Global Survey, ed. Rory Medcalf, Katherine Mansted, Stephan Früling, and James 
Goldrick (Canberra, Australia: National Security College at The Australian National University, February 
2020), 34, https://nsc.crawford.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/publication/nsc_crawford_anu_edu_au/2020-
02/the_future_of_the_undersea_deterrent.pdf. Hermann Kahn’s book, On Escalation: Metaphors and 
Scenarios, set out to define the 44 “ladder rungs” of nuclear escalation; it was published in 1965. 
63 Mikhail Tsypkin, “Rudderless in a Storm,” 162. 
22 
power ballistic-missile submarines (SSBN), Russia’s sea-based arm of its strategic nuclear 
triad, the force declined from 62 (1999) to 28 (2000) total platforms with only 15 percent 
operational.64   
From June 21–29, 1999, Russia commenced the military-wide exercise, Zapad-99 
(translated West-99) that involved 50,000 troops from all of Russia’s military districts.65  
The exercise was designed around a notional invasion from the west by more superior 
forces (in terms of higher caliber technology and conventional capabilities) because of 
Moscow’s alarm at how the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) exhibited the 
willingness and the ability to extend its reach beyond its own defined security boundaries 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina.66  Naval forces from Russia’s Northern, Baltic Sea, and Black 
Sea Fleets and the Caspian Sea Flotilla participated in the exercise and staged nine tactical 
exercises including surface combatants, nuclear-powered submarines, and support 
vessels.67  Zapad-99 occurred just months after the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia and 
was designed to demonstrate Russia’s resolve and ability to wage substantial military 
operations in response to any potential eastward expansion by NATO.68  The de-escalation 
approach was incorporated, to some extent, into Zapad-99 and further validated Russia’s 
negative perception of NATO and, coupled with Russian Defense Minister Sergeev’s 
disappointment in the operation and combat shortcomings in the exercise, highlighted 
Russian willingness to use nuclear weapons primarily in a deterrent capacity but at the 
tactical and regional levels.69  The lessons learned from Zapad-99, the assessed 
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shortcomings, and neglected forces of the military, especially the RFN, would form the 
basis for subsequent approaches to strategic deterrence and how the Kremlin would 
approach military modernization efforts. 
C. RUSSIAN STRATEGIC DETERRENCE – THEORETICAL APPROACH 
FROM 2000–2010  
The 2000s ushered in a new era for Russia. Vladimir Putin had been elected 
president and assumed office with the intent to stabilize the military, develop conventional 
capabilities to compensate for their inferiority, and to re-define Russia’s approach to 
deterrence doctrine. Deterrence would be expanded to become a combination of nuclear 
and conventional weapons designed to counter and more effectively deter U.S. and western 
threats. This would normalize the term strategic deterrence in Russian deterrence 
thinking.70  The normalization of the term strategic deterrence from the Russian vantage is 
critical to understanding how Russia may seek to influence or coerce any potential 
adversary.71  Kristin Ven Bruusgaard argues that the Russian use and application of 
strategic deterrence is broader than the Western understanding and, beginning in 2000, has 
become even more expansive to contain offensive and defensive, nuclear, non-nuclear, and 
non-military deterrent tools.72 
The expansion of Russia’s approach to strategic deterrence began as Putin entered 
into  his first term in office; he and, eventually, his Minister of Defense, started first by 
signing new versions of Russia’s primary security documents and decrees, as follows: 73   
National Security Concept (NSC) – Approved by presidential decree on 
January 10, 2000: This document served to outline Russia’s national 
interests during a “world situation characterized by a system of international 
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relations undergoing dynamic transformation.”74  The NSC is notable 
because its reproach of the West and the United States and for the revision, 
although subtle, of Russia’s nuclear posture.75  Yeltsin’s 1993 security 
concept allowed for nuclear weapons first “in case of a threat to the 
existence to the Russian Federation,” (the basis of the Theory of De-
escalation) whereas the 2000 NSC allowed “such use to repulse armed 
aggression, if all other means of resolving the crisis have been exhausted.”76 
These notable changes highlight the perceived threat to Russia and also emphasize the 
underlying motivation and direction for Russia to pursue conventional capabilities to 
counter or match that perceived threat and actual or contrived military capabilities of the 
West and the United States. (For reference, the National Security Concept was renamed to 
the National Security Strategy in 2009.) 
Military Doctrine 2000 – Approved by presidential edict on April 21, 
2000: As explained by political scientist, Dale R. Herspring, Military 
Doctrine 2000 “made it clear that Moscow keep the right to use nuclear 
weapons or other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) against Russia or its 
allies, as well as in response to large-scale conventional aggression in 
critical situation for Russian national security.”77   
This, as with the NSC, is also an indication of the status of the deteriorated state of Russia’s 
conventional weapons and forces.  
The Military Doctrine 2000 also identified the threats to the Russian Federation 
(RF) as “interference in RF internal affairs, attempts to ignore RF interests in resolving 
international security problems; attempts to oppose the increase of influence of the RF on 
a global level, the expansion of military blocs and alliances, the introduction of foreign 
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troops (without United Nations Security Council sanction) to the territory of contiguous 
states friendly with the RF, and the suppression of the rights of RF citizens abroad.”78 
The priority tasks of the development of the Armed Forces of the Russian 
Federation – published by the Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Ivanov 
on October 2, 2003 and approved by the Russian Council of National 
Security in June 2005: Also known as the Defense White Paper 2003 (DWP 
2003), was published as a doctrine to explain RF military operations and 
military capabilities.79   
The DWP also included possibly using armed forces for national defense and in 
various peacekeeping operations.80  Regarding RF military capabilities, DWP 2003 has 
also been assessed to be a response to U.S. and West military modernizations and NATO 
enlargement and a directive for what the “military requirements for the development of the 
Russian military organization to 2015.”81  Further, DWP 2003 emphasized the need for 
more modern conventional weapons and platforms and a need for reliance on advanced 
missile systems, precision-guided munitions, tactical air forces, and also established the 
necessity to keep conflicts as short as possible.82  
Collectively, this decade of oscillating between nuclear de-escalation and strategic 
deterrence would result in a push toward military restructuring and modernization to 
compete with the actual and perceived threats to the RF. Strategic deterrence as it had been 
defined in this decade, especially with the incorporation of conventional capabilities to 
deter adversaries, set the course for the years following. As argued by former Russian 
Deputy Defense Minister Andrei Kokoshin in 2003, there were clear limits to the 
effectiveness of nuclear deterrence and it was therefore necessary for Russia to invest in 
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the development of conventional precision-strike weapons systems or, as they viewed it, a 
credible ‘pre-nuclear deterrence’.83  These approaches to Russian national security and 
defense would be the doctrinal impetus for the future and direction of RFN modernization 
and employment, near and abroad.84 
1. Russian Federation Navy (2000–2010) 
In 2000, with the economy stabilizing, the Russian Federation published and 
released Foundations of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Naval 
Activity Until 2010, a policy written to reflect the key policy documents of the decade 
(Foundations of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Naval Activity 
Until 2010 was amended in 2012 for the period until 2020 and again in 2017 for the period 
until 2030). This document set forth strategic guidelines for the RFN, outlined basic 
principles for Russia’s maritime policy, and touched upon naval preservation and the future 
of Russian naval power—not only for modernization but also the role of the RFN in 
protecting Russian national interests and security.85  Follow-up doctrines to the 
Foundations of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Naval Activity 
Until 2010 included the Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation approved in July 
2001 and the Strategy for the Development of the Shipbuilding Industry until the Year 2020 
and Beyond in 2007.86   
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In the period of time between the approval of Foundations of the State Policy of the 
Russian Federation in the Field of Naval Activity Until 2010 and Maritime Doctrine of the 
Russian Federation, the RFN faced a dilemma representing the larger strategic deterrence 
questions that Kremlin and the Ministry of Defense were working to resolve; the dilemma 
of the dual-fleet and of nuclear versus conventional capabilities.  
The RFN had fallen into a serious state of disrepair and neglect by the end of the 
second millennium. On August 10, 2000, Russia’s Northern Fleet commenced ‘Summer-
X,’ its largest exercise in over a decade, designed to exhibit the strength of RFN units to 
the newly elected President Putin and to appeal for funding.87  On August 12, 2000, two 
explosions not related to Summer-X were detected in the vicinity of the Northern Fleet 
exercise, later determined to be the Kursk, a six-year old Oscar-class nuclear-powered 
guided-missile submarine (SSGN) (NATO Name: Oscar II SSGN); the explosions killed 
the submarine’s entire crew and were linked to faulty welding on its Type-65 torpedoes.88 
The sinking of the Kursk was a physical representation of the broken relationship 
permeating Russian military leadership. There was tension between Defense Minister 
Marshall Igor Sergeev and Chief of the General Staff Anatolii Kvashnin, a power-struggle 
that represented relationship friction between nuclear and conventional weapons.89  
Sergeev, a carry-over from former President Boris Yeltsin’s administration, preferred to 
focus spending on nuclear weapons, capabilities, and continuing the de-escalation 
approach to deterrence; whereas, Kvashnin championed investment in conventional 
weapons to protect Russia’s interests and achieve the capability to wage war anywhere in 
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the world.90  From this tragedy, the RF military forces’ budgets were substantially 
increased. In an effort to align the RFN with the decade’s (2000–2010) geopolitical and 
doctrinal assertiveness, Putin gave the RFN increased political attention and funding (the 
surge of oil resulted in Russia’s national budget increasing in this time period (Table 3).91  
Most importantly, this tragedy led presidential and other senior politicians to publicly 
declare the necessity for completely and drastically reforming the conventional military 
forces.92 
Table 3. Russian Military Expenditures: Years 2001, 2005, 2008–201093 
Russian Military Expenditures: Years 2001, 2005, 2008–2010 




(Billions - Rubles) 
National Defense 
Spending 
as share of GDP (%) 
SIPRI Estimate of 
Military Spending 
(Billions - Rubles) 
SIPRI Estimate of 
Military Spending 
as a share of GDP 
(%) 
2001 248 2.8 365 4.1 
2005 581 2.7 806 3.7 
2008 1,041 2.5 1,448 3.5 
2009 1,188 3.0 1,693 4.3 
2010 1,517 2.8 1,782 4.0 
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This decade was a pivotal, but still missed the mark effort at reforming the RFN. 
The decade’s approach to strategic deterrence focused on effectively employing nuclear 
and conventional forces given that Russian conventional forces were considerably derelict. 
The key military and security documents, while identifying Russia’s main adversaries and 
the need for modernized conventional forces, were a limited effort to codify RFN missions 
and delineate what type of, and how many, naval platforms would be required to protect 
and secure Russia.94 
D. EXPANDED STRATEGIC DETERRENCE – THEORETICAL 
APPROACH FROM 2010-PRESENT DAY 
Russian strategic deterrence, beginning in 2010, expanded to incorporate the 
inclusion of non-nuclear and non-military components in order to further deter 
conventional and non-traditional security threats.95  According to the Ministry of Defense 
of the Russian Federation, at present day, strategic deterrence is defined as: 
A coordinated system of military and non-military (political, diplomatic, 
legal, economic, ideological, scientific–technical and others) measures 
taken consecutively or simultaneously…with the goal of deterring military 
action entailing damage of a strategic character…Strategic deterrence is 
directed at the stabilization of the military–political situation…in order to 
influence an adversary within a predetermined framework, or for the de-
escalation of military conflict…The objects to be influenced through 
strategic deterrence may be the military–political leadership and/or the 
population of the potential adversary state (or coalition of 
states)…Strategic-deterrent measures are carried out continuously, both in 
peacetime and in wartime, not only to prevent any forceful actions that 
cause or could damage the strategic scale of the subject, but also to keep the 
object within a certain framework, as well as to de-escalate the military 
conflict.96 
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It is this current definition and understanding of strategic deterrence that is central 
to Russia’s view of the strategic environment and their current approach to warfare, while 
not official, has become the unified definition for official Russian doctrine.97  Daniel Flynn 
highlights that “Russian strategists view ‘deterrence’ operations as occurring both prior to 
and after the outbreak of hostilities.”98  That is to say, prior to hostilities, Moscow’s goal 
is to dissuade U.S. or NATO intervention by shaping the strategic environment and during 
hostilities, Russia’s goal is to induce de-escalation, prevent increased aggression, and end 
hostilities quickly and in terms favorable to Moscow.99   
Comparable to the Theory of De-escalation approach, Russian strategists began to 
consider and accept that conventional weapons could provide the same deterrent, 
prevention, and/or control effects as nuclear weapons.100  Moreover, those strategists are 
now adhering to this expanded view of expanded strategic deterrence but accepting a 
broader concept of ‘pre-emption.’101  This concept of pre-emption has been presented to 
serve one or more of these purposes: 
∑ Deterrence by cost imposition. Pre-emptive attacks on countervalue 
targets could provide a “punch in the nose” that deters U.S. or NATO 
aggression by communicating to Western policymakers and publics 
alike that the costs of attacking or escalating a military confrontation 
with Russia will outweigh any plausible benefits. This would include 
pre-emptive attacks aiming for U.S. and NATO vital infrastructure, such 
as communication networks underpinning basic economic and other 
public functions. 
∑ Deterrence by denial. Pre-emptive attacks on counterforce targets 
could degrade U.S. or NATO power projection capabilities, and change 
the “correlation of forces,” such that Washington and other NATO 
capitals no longer believe that they can prevail in a major war, at 
acceptable levels of escalation, against Russia. 
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∑ Pre-emption as a defeat mechanism. Pre-emptive attacks on key 
Western aerospace and other capabilities may allow the Russian armed 
forces to degrade or eliminate U.S. and NATO forces’ comparative 
advantages, such as long-range strike, thereby improving Russia’s 
relative military-operational position.102 
It is the above current definition of strategic deterrence and the concept of pre-emption that 
has informed key Russian state, strategy, security, and military documents currently 
guiding Russian security and defense activities. 
a. The Current Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation and RFN Tasks 
The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, approved by President Putin on 
December 25, 2014, codifies the main tasks of the Russia military and “is aimed at 
deterring and preventing military conflicts, improving military organization and forms and 
methods of employment of the Armed Forces, other troops and bodies, and enhancing 
mobilization readiness in order to ensure defense and security of the Russian Federation, 
as well as interests of its allies” and implements the National Security Strategy.103   The 
Military Doctrine, without naming the United States directly, identifies the external threats 
to the Russian Federation as:  
Build-up of the power potential of the NATO…deployment (build-up) of 
military contingents of foreign states (groups of states) in the territories of 
the states contiguous with the Russian Federation and its allies, as well as 
in adjacent waters, including for exerting political and military pressure on 
the Russian Federation…establishment and deployment of strategic missile 
defense systems undermining global stability and violating the established 
balance of forces related to nuclear missiles, implementation of the global 
strike concept…as well as deployment of strategic non-nuclear systems of 
high-precision weapons.104 
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The 2014 Military Doctrine, like the 2010 doctrine, also emphasizes that deterrence should 
be achieved using nuclear and non-nuclear means.105 
The RFN’s specific tasks are delineated in Articles 32–34 of the Military Doctrine 
as part of the larger directive to the Russian Armed Forces. In addition to the general tasks 
of defending and protecting sovereignty and Russian territory, the RFN is assigned with 
‘strategic deterrence,’ combatting piracy and safety of navigation, security of economic 
activity on the high seas, and the protection of Russian interests in the Arctic.106  It is these 
tasks that are set forth in the Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation 
in the Field of Naval Operations for the Period Until 2030, which underscores the use of 
the RFN in support of national interests. 
b. Russian Federation’s National Security Strategy 
Russia’s National Security Strategy (NSS2015) provides some insight into the 
capabilities and security perceptions that drive Russian strategic thinking. NSS2015, 
Article 6 defines Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept, which is Russia’s contemporary 
understandings of “national security…national interests…threats to national 
security…strategic national priorities…measures aimed to counter threats…and a system 
safeguarding national security.”107  Experts differ regarding the importance of NSS2015. 
Vasiliy Zatsepin, a Russian specialist in national security and defense economics, argues 
that NSS2015 is a “declaratory document which poorly correlates with the reality” and 
should not necessarily be deemed reliable for guiding future military action.108  In contrast, 
Russian Security Specialist Katri Pynnöniemi contends that NSS2015 offers a rather 
realistic perspective to Russia’s security and its defensive posture, even though it follows 
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the 2008 Russian incursion into Georgia and the 2014 annexation of Crimea.109  NSS2015 
asserts “an increase in the Russian Federation’s role in resolving the most important 
international problems, settling military conflicts, and ensuring strategic stability and the 
supremacy of international law in interstate relations,” lending claims to the Russian’s key 
role and position among the ‘great powers.’110  This approach to National Security was 
resonant also in 2012 when then Prime Minister Putin exclaimed, “we should not tempt 
anyone by allowing ourselves to be weak…[it] is for this reason that we will under no 
circumstances surrender our strategic deterrent capability, and indeed, will in fact 
strengthen it,” which was an obvious signal to both domestic and foreign audiences 
regarding Russia’s view of the strategic global environment and Russia’s strategic 
deterrence.111 
c. Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation 
The current Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, approved by 
President Vladimir Putin on November 30, 2016, explicitly indicates that Russia seeks to 
assert itself as a “center of influence” in what it characterizes as a multipolar international 
system.112  Further assertions in the Russian Foreign Policy Concept also provide insight 
into Putin’s perspective of the global strategic environment. Specifically alluding to an 
alleged global power disparity and rising international tensions, these circumstances 
require Russia to play an instrumental role in eliminating such disparities and tensions and 
also provide strategic stability in the shifting political landscape.113  These ever-present 
themes of realpolitik and Balance of Power are further obvious in the above associated 
strategy and doctrine. 
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d. Potential Russian strategic deterrence Actions During Peacetime, Crisis, 
and Conflict 
As explained, the current and evolved Russian approach to strategic deterrence 
encompasses actions during peacetime, crisis, and conflict.114  Those potential actions, as 
presented by David Flynn, will be used to examine RFN activities in the following chapter 
(Table 4). Additionally, the following chapter will examine the current and evolved 
approach to strategic deterrence to deduce the RFN’s role in Russian ‘strategic deterrence.’  
It will present modernization efforts designed to achieve the prescribed strategic deterrence 
goals and explore RFN missions and objectives.  
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Table 4. Potential Coercive Actions during Peacetime, Crisis, and 
Conflict115 
Peacetime Increasing Tensions – Crisis Initial Period of Conflict 
Goal: Shape the strategic  
environment to dissuade  
aggression against Russian 
interests. 
Goal: Prevent crisis from 
evolving to military conflict by 
deterring aggression. 
Goal: Compel a de-escalation  
deter further aggression 
through actions taken pre-
emptively or during the early 
stages of conflict. 
Use information, economic,  
diplomatic, and psychological 
means to shape perceptions 
through strategic messaging. 
Conduct strategic messaging to  
foster divisions between  
Washington and allies. 
Conduct limited cyber and 
other information attacks on 
critical infrastructure, 
including non-destructive 
attacks on satellite systems. 
Signal and demonstrate new  
military capabilities. 
Manipulate export of energy 
supplies as part of economic 
coercion. 
Conduct destructive attacks on 
space systems. 
Conduct military exercises to 
demonstrate military strength. 
Demonstrate preparedness for  
military actions by deploying 
forces and conducting snap  
exercises. 
Employ conventional 
precision-strike systems in 
limited attacks against critical 
infrastructure in the initial 
period of conflict. 
Employ primarily non-military 
means, including cyber 
activities and covert support to 
proxies, to advance interests 
while staying below the 
threshold for open warfare to 
avoid prompting foreign 
intervention. 
Signal capbilties to conduct  
specific deterrence actions by  
openly deploying key  
capabilities, such as 
counterspace weapons and 
Iskander missile systems. 
Use nonstrategic nuclear 
weapons in a limited or  
demonstration mode. 
 
Demonstrate cyber capabilities 
through manipulation of key  
adversary information systems. 
Employ strategic nuclear 
forces in a limited or 
demonstration mode. 
 
Conduct nuclear saber rattling 
through official statements 





115 Source: Flynn, 41. 
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III. RUSSIA’S EXPANDED STRATEGIC DETERRENCE AND 
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION NAVY 
A. INTRODUCTION  
This chapter will introduce the current security and military documents that apply 
to the RFN. It will examine Maritime and Naval Doctrines of the Russian Federation that 
have been issued in the last decade in order to compare strategic deterrence intentions, as 
discussed in Chapter II, with observed RFN’s modernization efforts (RFN operations will 
be discussed under the same criterion in Chapter IV).  This chapter will also discuss RFN 
modernization efforts as they relate to publicized and projected needs and expanded 
strategic deterrence goals. This chapter seeks to explore how Russian naval capabilities 
have shifted in tandem with Russia’s changing definition and mission of strategic 
deterrence, and to determine if Russia’s codified deterrence strategy has actually 
influenced naval strategy and force modernization efforts. Furthermore, this chapter will 
explore the coercive, cross-domain or “new generation warfare” strategies of the Russian 
Federation and the RFN platforms, tactics, and weapons intended to achieve strategic 
deterrence of U.S./NATO forces in the maritime domain and to provide insight into 
Russian naval strategy and outlook.116   
B. RUSSIAN FEDERATION NAVY: MARITIME AND NAVAL DOCTRINES  
Since 2010, Russia’s focus for maritime and naval development has centered 
largely on the protection and security of its coastline and support of its land forces. As 
highlighted in Chapter II, the main tasks of the RFN (delineated in Articles 32–34 of The 
Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation) emphasize naval missions as ‘strategic 
deterrence,’ combatting piracy and safety of navigation, security of economic activity on 
the high seas, and the protection of Russian interests in the Arctic.117  It should be noted 
 
116 Dmitry (Dima) Adamsky, “From Moscow with Coercion: Russian Deterrence Theory and 
Strategic Culture,” Journal of Strategic Studies 41, no. 1–2 (July 2017): 33–60. https://doi.org/10.1080/
01402390.2017.1347872.  
117 The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, Articles 32–34. 
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that global military competition (also currently known as the Great Power Competition) is 
at the forefront of The Military Doctrine, a theme that repeats in the maritime and naval 
doctrines. However, The Military Doctrine, while acknowledging increasing military 
threats on Russia’s periphery and to its sphere of influence, does not view large-scare war 
as likely.118  Moreover, for the purposes of evaluating RFN doctrine and modernization, 
The Military Doctrine claims that U.S. and NATO actions such as NATO expansion, 
regional military buildup, deployment of strategic and high-precision weapons, and 
territorial claims against Russia to be the greatest external risk to Russia’s security and 
stability.119 
1. The 2015 Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation 
Published in 2015, The Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation highlighted 
Moscow’s intention to develop its maritime and naval capabilities across multiple domains, 
including the use of the RFN. Michael Petersen, Director of Russia Maritime Studies, 
United States Naval War College, in his evaluation of The Maritime Doctrine of the 
Russian Federation, argued that it is “one of the most important doctrinal statements to 
emerge from that country in recent years…the most important recent articulation of 
maritime interests and goals, and therefore provides insight into how Moscow envisions 
Russia’s global role.”120  The Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation identifies the 
roles and responsibilities of the RFN and also offers insight into how Moscow might 
approach a maritime conflict with the West and the regional goals from which to assess 
RFN operations. 
The National Maritime Policy is defined by the state and society as: 
The goals, principles, directions, objectives, and the methods of achieving 
national interests of the Russian Federation in the coastal, internal, 
 
118 The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, Articles 2–4.  
119 The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, Article 12. 
120 The Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation, trans. Anna Davis (Newport, RI: Russia 





territorial, and the exclusive  economic zone, on the continental shelf of 
the Russian Federation and in the blue-water, as well as the implementation 
of maritime activities.121 
This definition includes both civilian and military maritime activities. It is important to 
note that civilian maritime activities can include, but are not limited to, research, 
exploration, resource extraction, economic, and scientific activities, this will be a critical 
point when examining Russia’s Arctic activities and operations.  
Regarding the RFN, The Maritime Doctrine states that Russia prefers “political-
diplomatic, legal, economic, informational, and other non-military means in conflict 
resolution” to eliminate “existing and recurring challenges and threats to the national 
security of the Russian Federation from the ocean and sea.”122  However, Russia will 
maintain the “sufficient naval potential and its effective implementation when it is a 
necessity to apply force in support of maritime activities of the state, elimination of threats 
to national security of the Russian Federation from the ocean and the sea, and ensuring 
inviolability of the state borders of the Russian Federation.”123   
Following the aforementioned security threats in Russia’s expanded definition of 
‘strategic deterrence,’ the doctrine also continues to highlight Russia’s maritime security 
priorities, as follows: 
Atlantic Regional Priority Area:  The doctrine emphasizes that NATO is the 
highest security priority in the Atlantic Regional Area. This area, according to the doctrine 
includes the Atlantic Ocean, the Baltic, the Black, and Azov Seas, as well as the 
Mediterranean Sea.124  Russia’s main goal for the Atlantic is to ensure sufficient (no 
further information) naval presence and to develop and grow economic transportation and 
scientific exploration.125  Russia’s main goal for the Mediterranean Sea is to ensure a 
 
121 The Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation, 5. 
122 The Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation, 7. 
123 The Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation, 8. 
124 The Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation, 19. 
125 The Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation, 19. 
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permanent naval presence, pursue a policy to transform the region into a “zone of military-
political stability and goodwill,” and expand travel cruise passage from Russian Black Sea 
ports to Mediterranean countries.126This thesis will examine the RFN platforms assigned 
and deployed to the Atlantic Ocean and Mediterranean Sea, as well as its missions and 
operations in those areas. 
The Arctic Regional Priority Area:  Russia’s maritime priorities in this region 
are to reduce the level of national security threats to the RF and ensure Arctic strategic 
stability; strengthen the potential and develop the capabilities of the Northern Fleet; 
strengthen RF economic potential in the Arctic, Northern Sea Route, and North Atlantic 
by exploration, exploitation, and extraction of natural resources; develop the Russian 
Northern Sea Route; recognize Russia’s external borders of the continental shelf; establish 
search and rescue and Northern Fleet bases along the Arctic coast; develop Arctic 
monitoring systems (this list is not fully inclusive but highlights the central Arctic goals 
that may or do involve the RFN).127 
The remaining areas of priority are, in order: The Pacific Regional Priority Area, 
The Caspian Regional Priority Area, The Indian Ocean Regional Priority Area, and The 
Antarctic Regional Priority Area. This thesis will not address these regional priority areas 
but does mention them to emphasize the order of Russia’s maritime priorities. 
2. The Russian Federation in the Field of Naval Operations Until 2030 
In 2017, President Putin approved The Russian Federation in the Field of Naval 
Operations Until 2030 (hereinafter referred to as Russian Naval Policy) after RFN 
modernization efforts and platforms were fielded and put to sea. The Maritime Doctrine 
provides a strong and articulate declaration of Russia’s interests in the maritime domain 
and the context for interpreting the Naval Policy. The Naval Policy subsequently “yields 
important insights into the role envisaged for naval forces in advancing both the interests 
 
126 The Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation, 22. 
127 The Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation, 24–25. 
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and objectives” described in the Maritime Doctrine.128  The Russian Naval Policy provides 
direction for RFN operations of blue- and green-water platforms, including the new nuclear 
and non-nuclear weapons and capabilities and, most importantly, codifies that “the Russian 
Federation will not allow significant superiority of naval forces of other states over its Navy 
and will strive to secure its position as the second most combat capable Navy in the 
world.”129  This declaration is an obvious statement that Russia considers itself second to 
the United States Navy. It can be deduced, therefore, that in terms of future capabilities 
and aims, Russia is seeking to have nearly equal capabilities as the USN. Further, the 
Russian Naval Policy outlines general provisions for the RFN, which includes the 
identification of risks and threats to Russian national security, and codifies RFN goals, 
objectives, and priorities, as any naval policy typically does.  
Significantly, the policy has specific guidance on the use of the RFN as an effective 
instrument of strategic deterrence:  
1. Maintaining operational and combat capabilities of the Navy at a level that 
secures for it one of the leading positions in the world. 
2. Development and maintenance of the naval capability to strike ground 
targets of a potential enemy with conventional as well as nuclear weapons. 
3. Balanced development of the Navy to prevent exclusive superiority of the 
U.S. Navy and naval forces of other leading maritime powers over it. 
 
128 Richard Connolly, Document Review: Fundamentals of the state policy of the Russian Federation 
in the field of naval operations for the period until 2030 (Rome, Italy: NATO Defense College, January 
2019), http://www.ndc.nato.int/research/research.php?icode=574. “The naval policy restates these now 
familiar themes in a maritime context. The policy refers to ‘leading world powers, possessing significant 
naval capabilities and an extensive network of military installations, [continuing] to build up their naval 
presence in…vital areas of the World Ocean, including waters adjacent to the territory of the Russian 
Federation’…Many of the threats and objectives outlined in the naval policy are restatements of those 
found in previous documents. Thus, the naval policy reiterates the need for Russia to remain a ‘great sea 
power,’ because a strong navy is required to secure Russia’s position as a leading power in a multipolar 
order.” (Connolly). 
129 Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Naval Operations for 
the Period Until 2030, trans. Anna Davis (Newport, RI: Russia Maritime Studies Institute, Naval War 





4. Ensuring continued presence of naval forces (troops) in strategically 
important maritime regions of the world’s ocean. 
5. Establishing a modern border protection security system of the Russian 
Federation, ensuring a favorable environment in the maritime space and 
beyond.130   
While these priority areas of the naval policy are largely aspirational, they do reflect the 
current understanding of expanded strategic deterrence.  
Moreover, according to Russian Naval Policy, the RFN is regarded as “one of the 
most effective instruments of strategic (nuclear and nonnuclear) deterrence, including 
preventing global strike.”131  The RFN is tasked to maintain naval capabilities to ensure 
deterrence of aggression and to bring to bear unacceptable damage on any potential 
adversary.132  The alleged ability of the RFN to project a presence across the world’s 
oceans and its possession of an arsenal of strategic nuclear and conventional, high-
precision weapons has afforded the RFN a “qualitatively new objective to destroy vital 
enemy military and economic facilities and infrastructure from the sea;” a claim that the 
RFN cannot yet attain in its current state.133  Specifically, the policy identifies key 
maritime domains in which the RFN shall secure a permanent naval presence and 
 
130 Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Naval Operations for 
the Period Until 2030, 11. 
131 Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Naval Operations for 
the Period Until 2030, 11. It should be noted that the Kremlin does not having a standing definition for 
‘Prompt Global Strike.’  However, the Kremlin has been readily concerned with the U.S. using a prompt 
global strike (using conventional weapons) against Russian Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) and 
ICBM associated command and control (C2) and national control authority (NCA). Therefore, for the 
purposes of this thesis, Prompt Global Strike is defined as the U.S. capability of “launching a devastating 
non-nuclear surprise attack on Russia. It is designed to work on the basis that 6,000 cruise missiles, all 
launched within one hour, would be aimed at operational and strategic targets (including nuclear weapons 
silos) within Russia.” Rod Thornton, “Countering Prompt Global Strike: The Russian Military Presence in 
Syria and the Eastern Mediterranean and Its Strategic Deterrence Role,” The Journal of Slavic Military 
Studies32, no. 1 (January 2019): 15, https://doi.org/10.1080/13518046.2019.1552655 and James M. Acton, 
“Russia and Strategic Conventional Weapons: Concerns and Responses,” The Nonproliferation Review 22, 
no. 2 (2015) 141–142, https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2015.1105434.  
132 Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Naval Operations for 
the Period Until 2030, 6. 
133 Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Naval Operations for 
the Period Until 2030, 12. 
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implement its understanding of strategic deterrence: the Black Sea (with special attention 
on maintaining control of the Crimean Peninsula), the Mediterranean Sea, the Arctic, and 
vital sea lines of communication; a reflection of the aforementioned Maritime Doctrine of 
the Russian Federation.134  Further, the Russian Naval Policy is explicit in alleging that 
the U.S. global strike capabilities are directly threatening Russian security.135  It is through 
this lens that this thesis will evaluate, analyze, and gauge effectiveness of key RFN 
operations and weapons since modernization and policy efforts took effect.  
C. RFN FORCE MODERNIZATION EFFORTS 
1. State Armament Program to 2020 (GPV-2020) 
Following a period of relatively low levels of military confrontation, in  
2010 President Medvedev signed and approved the State Armament Program 2020  
(GPV-2020)—“a 10-year programme (sic) designed to support  the large-scale 
procurement of a wide range of military equipment that would modernize the Russian 
armed forces.”136  Per the naval policy, modernization objectives of the Navy are to: 
1. Establish a balanced Navy structure. 
2. Maintain the combat potential of the naval strategic nuclear forces at a 
high level. 
3. Establish a qualitatively new conventional naval force, equipped with new 
and modernized weapons, and new and modernized military and special 
equipment.137 
 
134 Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Naval Operations for 
the Period Until 2030, 12. 
135 Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Naval Operations for 
the Period Until 2030, 11. 
136 Richard Connolly and Mathieu Boulègue, Russia’s New State Armament Programme: 
Implications for the Russian Armed Forces and Military Capabilities to 2027 (London, England: The 
Chatham House of The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2018), https://www.chathamhouse.org/
publication/russia-s-new-state-armament-programme-implications-russian-armed-forces-and-military.  
137 Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Naval Operations for 
the Period Until 2030, 14. 
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The combined efforts of the Russian Naval Policy and the GPV-2020 codified RFN 
priorities which allocated 26% of defense funding to be spent to “finance the procurement 
of more than two dozen modern submarines, including SSBNs, more than 50 surface 
combat vessels and dozens of other types of naval vessels, including several French-built 
Mistral-class helicopter carriers.”138  Totaling 20 trillion rubles ($680 billion U.S.), GPV-
2020 set out ambitious military equipment procurement and weapon system research and 
development plans.139 
GPV-2020 funding, therefore, reflected the Russian Federation priorities of 
strategic deterrence and defending economic interests, but, as critiques of Russian naval 
policy highlight, provided no methods or means for resolving or accomplishing these 
goals.140  Indeed, after a decade of modernization efforts, Russia was able to complete only 
17 surface combatants and 3 SSBNs. The production disturbances can be attributed to 
underdeveloped production chains, unfinished development of new naval weapons and 
electronic systems, a declining economy, and economic sanctions following the 2014 
Russian annexation of Crimea.141  As analysis by the European Union Institute for Security 
Studies highlighted, “GPV-2020 was drawn up on the assumption that the Russian 
economy would grow at 7% per annum over the course of the programme (sic). In fact, it 
 
138 Connolly and Boulègue, Russia’s New State Armament Programme, 6. 
139 Julian Cooper, Russia’s state armament programme to 2020: a quantitative assessment of 
implementation 2011–2015, FOI-R-4239-SE (Stockholm, Sweden: Swedish Defense Research Agency, 
March 2016), 4, DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.1.3859.3685.  
140 Konstantin Bogdanov and Ilya Kramnik, The Russian Navy in the 21st Century: The Legacy and 
the New Path, IOP-2018-U-018268-Final (Arlington, VA: CNA, Corp., 2018), 11, https://www.cna.org/
CNA_files/PDF/IOP-2018-U-018268-Final.pdf. “Russian analysts argue that Russia’s United Shipbuilding 
Corporation is the least effective of all state corporations in Russia’s defense sector. This results from its 
excessive size, bloated management structures, and misguided efforts to combine military and civilian 
shipbuilding under a single corporate roof.” Dmitry Gorenburg, Russian Naval Shipbuilding: Is it Possible 
to Fulfill the Kremlin’s Grand Expectations?, PONARS Eurasia Memo No. 395 (Washington, D.C.: 
PONARS Eurasia at the George Washington University Elliot School of International Affairs, October 
2015), 3, https://www.ponarseurasia.org/node/8042.  
141 Bogdanov and Kramnik, 12–13. “In 2013, Russian growth plummeted to 1.3 percent a year instead 
of the 2–3 percent forecast. The confidence crisis following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014 
and its continuing aggression against Ukraine lowered growth expectations…Ongoing Western sanctions, 
Russian counter-sanctions and the dramatic fall in the oil price had added to the negative trend,” Susanne 
Oxenstierna, “Russia’s defense spending and the economic decline,” Journal of Eurasian Studies 7, no. 1 
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barely grew at all in 2014 and is forecast to contract by 3% to 5% in 2015” (Figure 1).142   
However, the RFN did experience a period of steady modernization that has resulted in a 
navy that has been able to accomplish or project Russia’s foreign policy, ‘strategic 
deterrence,’ and military initiatives.143 
 
Figure 1. Russia Military Spending, % of GDP and $USD Billions, 2000–
2018144 
GPV-2020, a defense spending plan designed to modernize the military and reflect 
Russia’s expanded approach to strategic deterrence, did not reach its prescribed production 
goals for the RFN, but it did achieve and field modernized platforms to re-establish the 
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prominence of  RFN operations in key strategic areas such as the Mediterranean, Black 
Sea, and Arctic (Tables 5 and 6). 
Table 5. GPV-2020 Objectives and Deliveries, to End 2015: Submarines145 
Russian Federation Navy: Submarines 
PLATFORM Developed GPV-2020 Goal 
Delivered by End  
of 2015 
SSBN       
Borei-Class (Project-955) 1997-2013 8 3 
Nuclear Multi-Role       
Yasen-Class (Project-885) 1993-2015 7 1 
Diesel-Electric        
Lada-Class (Project 677) 1997-2010 3 1 (Test Boat) 














145 Source: Richard Connolly and Cecile Sendstad, “Russian Rearmament: An Assessment of 
Defense-Industrial Performance,” Problems of Post-Communism 63, no. 3 (October 2016): 147, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/10758216.2016.1236668.  
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Table 6. GPV-2020 Objectives and Deliveries, to End 2015: Surface 
Vessels146 
Russian Federation Navy: Surface Vessels 
PLATFORM Developed GPV-2020 Goal 
Delivered 
by End  
of 2015 
Frigates       
Gorshkov-Class (Project 22350) 2006-2015 6 0 
Grigorovich-Class (Project 11356R) 2010-2015 6 0 
Corvettes       
Gremiashchy-Class (Project 20385) 2011-No Date 16 (2) 0 
Steregushchiy-Class (Project 20380) 2001-2007 12 (20) 3 
Small artillery ships       
Buyan-Class (Project 21630) 2004-2006 0 1 
Buyan-M-Class (Project 21631) 2008-2012 8-10 5 
Guard ships       
Gepard-Class (Project 1166.1/K) 1991-2002 1 1 
Landing craft       
Serna-Class (Project 11770) 1993-1994 - 2 
Ivan Gren-Class (Project 11711) 2004-2016 2 0 
Duigon-Class (Project 21820) 2006-2010 - 5 
Mistral-Class (LST from France) Foreign Military Sale 4 0 
 
2. State Armament Program to 2027 (GPV-2027) 
The GPV was originally designed to be reevaluated and reissued every five years. 
The plan to update GPV-2020 was intended to be released and executed in 2016. However, 
following significant delays tied to Russia’s annexation of Crimea, warfare with Ukraine, 
resulting economic sanctions, dropping oil prices, and bureaucratic infighting, the updated 
state armament plan, GPV-2027 was not approved until December 2017; GPV-2027 will 
 
146 Source: Richard Connolly and Cecile Sendstad, “Russian Rearmament: An Assessment of 
Defense-Industrial Performance,” 148.  
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run from 2018–2027.147  The total budget for GPV-2027 is approximately 20 trillion rubles 
with 19 trillion rubles (U.S. $260 billion) allocated for military equipment procurement, 
modernization, repair, and research and development.148  It should be noted that the GPV-
2027 budget is near that of GPV-2020 however, as highlighted by Richard Connolly and 
Mathieu Boulègue, the value of the ruble, since 2011, has been diminished by inflation—
in 2018, one ruble buys approximately one-half of what it did seven years ago and 
therefore, GPV-2027 is expected to be less ambitious than GPV-2020.149  GPV-2027, as 
outlined by Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, General Valeriy 
Gerasimov, emphasizes systems that enhance total force mobility and deployment, systems 
to improve logistics and joint force integration, strengthening command-and-control (C2) 
systems and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities to achieve 
network-centric warfare capabilities.150  There is also an increased emphasis on the 
procurement of high-precision weapons for air, sea, and land battle, including hypersonic 
missiles.151 
Under GPV-2027, the RFN is expected to receive a smaller share of the budget, in 
contrast to GPV-2020 under which the RFN received 26% of funding. Due to increased 
secrecy, the exact percentage of GPV-2027 funding is not known. Connolly and Boulègue 
observed that the Russian leadership, via GPV-2027, appears to have made the deliberate 
determination to focus on the formation of a ‘dual-fleet’:  
 
147 Julian Cooper, The Russian State Armament Programme, 2018–2027 (Rome, Italy: NATO 
Defense College, May 2018), 3, http://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=1167. “The troubled 
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volume of funding for GPV-2025.” (Cooper, 3.) 
148 Richard Connolly and Mathieu Boulègue, Russia’s New State Armament Programme: 
Implications for the Russian Armed Forces and Military Capabilities to 2027, 10. 
149 Richard Connolly and Mathieu Boulègue, Russia’s New State Armament Programme: 
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150 Richard Connolly and Mathieu Boulègue, Russia’s New State Armament Programme: 
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Combining potent new ‘green-water’ capabilities–i.e., new weapons 
systems focused on the protection of coastal areas and on preventing enemy 
forces from accessing Russian territory–with long-range blue-water 
capabilities based around the Soviet-era legacy fleet of modernized Kirov-
class and Slava-class cruisers, Sovremennyi-class and Udaloy-class 
destroyers, and nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs and SSGNs).152   
The first priority of GPV-2027 continues to be its strategic nuclear triad and that priority 
affects the RFN SSBN force.153  Cumulatively, however, “by 2027, Russia’s navy will still 
concentrate on strategic deterrence and status projection” and, to expand and improve anti-
access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities, will prioritize the submarine force.154 
a. RFN Submarines (GPV-2027) 
GPV-2020 sought to commission eight Borei-class SSBNs (refer to Figure 4), but 
only three had entered service by the end of 2017. The completion of the full complement 
of Borei-class SSBNs from GPV-2020, therefore, will likely be the priority of GPV-
2027.155  It is also assessed that the six remaining Yasen-class SSGN (NATO name: 
Severodvinsk), a multi-role submarine intended by GPV-2020, will be delivered by 2025–
2027 (each submarine is in a different stage of completion).156   
GPV-2027 also emphasizes modernizing legacy submarine platforms, SSNs and 
SSGNs (the dual-fleet concept), with Kalibr high-precision weapons and producing 
modernized varieties of legacy diesel-electric submarines that will also be equipped with 
high-precision weapons. 
About 10 modified Shchuka-B-class (Project 971M, NATO: Akula III) 
SSNs will have gone through modernization, renovation, and overhaul 
(MRO) by 2020, while the fleet of diesel-electric submarines will be 
 
152 Richard Connolly and Mathieu Boulègue, Russia’s New State Armament Programme: 
Implications for the Russian Armed Forces and Military Capabilities to 2027, 20. 
153 Julian Cooper, The Russian State Armament Programme, 2018–2027, 8.  
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strengthened by the production of more Varshavyanka-class (improved 
Kilo-class from Project 636.3) vessels equipped with Kalibr missiles.157 
Veiled in secrecy two special-purpose submarines, the ‘Belgorod’ and 
Khabarovsk’ are under construction. They are believed to be the potential 
carriers of the long-range, nuclear-armed, underwater drone mentioned by 
Putin in his state of the nation speech. Both are likely to enter service in the 
next few years, although the drone project is clearly a long way from 
completion.158 
These modernization, reconstitution, and legacy production efforts support the assessment 
that Russia’s ambition to procure new and highly capable submarines, as envisioned in 
GPV-2020 is unattainable due to extreme cost and economic stagnation.  
b. RFN Surface Vessels (GPV-2027) 
As with the RFN submarine force, GPV-2027 for the RFN surface vessels will 
focus on MRO and service life extension of the larger legacy ships and procurement of 
new, smaller frigates, corvettes, and coastal ships to be equipped with the Kalibr weapon 
system. The two RFN Kirov-class cruisers and the Sovremenny-class destroyers have both 
received service-life extensions, but with the limitations of and corruption in Russia’s 
shipbuilding industry, large-scale projects to produce cruisers and destroyers are not likely 
to occur under GPV-2027.159   
It is more likely that production of an augmented Gorshkov-class frigate—
a ‘Super Gorshkov’—will begin as shipbuilders adapt existing designs. 
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Larger vessels will be  equipped with Poliment-Redut surface-to-air 
missiles, still in testing and experiencing integration issues.160 
The RFN’s only aircraft carrier, Admiral Kuznetzov, began its MRO in 2018 with a focus 
non-critical systems (flight deck, arresting gear, and radar components) and is assessed to 
re-enter into operational service in 2021.161 While the RFN would like to have at least one 
more carrier, the cost and shipbuilding limitations will preclude production until at least 
2027 with earliest possible delivery to be in 2030.162 
Under GPV-2027, the emphasis on smaller surface vessels has increased. The focus 
for the RFN’s smaller surface vessels (frigates, corvettes, and coastal patrol ships) will be 
comprised of modernizing legacy ships and producing new ships with precision weapons 
systems. The new surface platforms, the Gremyashchiy-class and Steregushchiy-class 
corvettes and six Grigorovich-class frigates, will be equipped with the Kalibr weapon 
system. It should be noted, though, that the production of these vessels continues to suffer 
due to the breakdown of the Russian defense-industrial cooperation with Ukraine, 
sanctions that delayed and prohibited turbine imports, and problems associated with the 
anti-aircraft missile systems.163   
Additionally, it is worth noting that the Kremlin has also advertised intentions to 
equip their Kirov-class cruisers (Admiral Nakhimov and Pyotr Veliky) and Gremyashchiy 
FFG guided-missile frigate (advanced Steregushchiy-class FFG) with the 3M-22 Tsirkon 
(pronounced: Zirkon) hypersonic missile system. The Tsirkon is designed to defeat 
defensive systems at an estimated range of 400 to 1,000km at speeds of Mach 5 to Mach 8 
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(as reported by TASS). This missile has not been fully tested and many of its operational 
characteristics are not yet known.164 
3. Dual-Fleet Concept 
The ‘dual-fleet’ concept was introduced by Connolly in his NATO Defense College 
publication, Towards a Dual Fleet? The Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation and 
the Modernisation (sic) of Russian Naval Capabilities, in which he examined Russia’s 
Maritime Doctrine compared to the above described modernization efforts to determine 
how and to what extent the RFN can be expected to operate.165  Connolly argues that the 
emerging RFN force structure is sufficient to achieve the objectives of Maritime Doctrine, 
as the doctrine does not explicitly identify ‘global power projection’ as a core objective but 
rather suggests that Russia’s main interests exist closer to home.166  He explains that a 
dual-fleet concept has emerged, a dual-fleet “comprising larger Soviet-era legacy vessels 
and newer, smaller vessels equipped with long-range missiles to equip the Russian navy 
for its key strategic missions.”167   
Moreover, regarding the expanded definition of strategic deterrence and the 
understanding that one of the RFN’s main mission is ‘strategic deterrence,’ Connolly 
argues that it is possible to expect the RFN ‘dual fleet’ to perform the functions of ensuring 
Russian territorial security and flying the flag abroad.168  He concludes his argument by 
declaring that Russia’s Maritime Doctrine does not suggest that Russia is competing with 
the U.S. for control of the Atlantic Ocean, but rather that “Russian intentions are focused 
on seas much closer to its shores, and are directed towards not aiming for full control of 
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the seas in and around its borders, but instead on at least challenging or denying command 
of those areas considered to be of vital importance.”169  Furthermore, this ‘dual-fleet’ 
concept accepts the effects of the economic and shipbuilding constraints that materialized 
under GPV-2020. For Russia to achieve its optimal strategic deterrence, it will employ 
Soviet legacy platforms with newer, modern platforms in its key areas of interest (as 
identified per the Maritime Doctrine). This dual-fleet concept will be explored in the 
examination of RFN operations in Chapter IV.  
4. RFN Kalibr High-Precision Weapon System 
The Russian military planners have viewed conventional precision weapons as 
having the same combat effectiveness as nuclear weapons and are to be the first weapon to 
be used at the regional and global level for strategic deterrence.170  Guided by Russia’s 
definition of ‘strategic deterrence,’ the naval policy provided a qualitative emphasis on 
modernized weapons and declared that the primary armament of the “undersea, surface, 
and coastal forces of the Navy through 2025 will be long-range high-precision cruise 
missiles...to destroy vital enemy military and economic facilities and infrastructure from 
the sea” (Figure 2).171  This ambition, the ‘Kalibrisation of the Russian Navy,’ refers to 
wide deployment of the Kalibr family of missiles on surface and subsurface units (Table 
7).172 
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Figure 2. Russia’s Kalibr-NK (SS-N-30A SAGARIS also known as 3M-14 
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Table 7. Kalibr-Capable Vessels in Service (Number of Kalibr-Capable 
Launchers Installed), End of 2018174 
Type NATO Name Number In Service (# of VLS/Torpedo Tubes) per Fleet 











SSGN Severodvinsk (Yasen) 1 (40) 0 0 0 0 
SSGN Yasen-M 0 0 0 0 0 
SSGN Oscar II 0 0 0 0 0 
SSGN Akula IV 0 0 0 0 0 
SS Kilo (Project 877M) 0 0 0 0 0 
SS Kilo (Project 636.6) 0 6 (36) 0 0 0 
SS Lada 1 (6) 0 0 0 0 
CGN Kirov 0 0 0 0 0 
DDG Udaloy I 0 0 0 0 0 
DDG Udaloy II 0 0 0 0 0 
FFG Gorshkov 1 (16) 0 0 0 0 
FFG Krivak II 0 3 (24) 0 0 0 
FFG Steregushchy I 0 0 0 0 0 
FFG Steregushchy II 0 0 0 0 0 
FFG Gepard 0 0 0 0 2 (16) 
PGG Karakurt 0 0 1 (8) 0 0 
PGG Sviyazhsk 0 2 (16) 2 (16) 0 3 (24) 
 
As with the delays experienced in ship and submarine construction, the ambition to 
have ‘Kaliberised’ navy has not come to fruition; the delays of building new Kalibr-capable 
platforms and modernizing existing platforms have severely impacted RFN ability to 
achieve naval policy goals. According to Russian media calculations and a subsequent 
assessment by Richard Connolly, if Russia’s existing shipbuilding program is successful, 
then by 2025, the RFN should achieve an “additional 1,000 Kalibr-capable launch cells, 
compared to the current 202 installed launch systems...Russia could have 85 Kalibr-
capable platforms and over 1,200 launch cells deployed across its four fleets and flotilla” 
(Table 8).175   
 
174 Source: Richard Connolly, The Kalibrisation of the Russian Navy: Progress and Prospects, 3. 
175 Richard Connolly, The Kalibrisation of the Russian Navy: Progress and Prospects, 4–5. 
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Table 8. Kalibr-Capable Vessels Under Construction and Scheduled to be 
Built or Commissioned by 2024 (Number of Kalibr-Capable Launchers 
Installed), as of End of 2018176 
 
The Kalibr missile family currently consists of three variants, all of which launch 
from the same vertical launch systems (VLS): SS-N-27 (3M-54) SIZZLER anti-ship cruise 
missile (ASCM); SS-N-30 SAGARIS land-attack cruise missile (LACM); 91R anti-
submarine rocket (ASROC).177  There are two versions of the SS-N-27 ASCM: the 3M-
54E has a subsonic cruise stage and supersonic terminal/kill stage with a 220 km (119 nm) 
range; the 3M-54E1 version has a 300 km (161nm) range and larger warhead.178  The SS-
 
176 Source: Richard Connolly, The Kalibrisation of the Russian Navy: Progress and Prospects, 4. 
177 “SS-N-30A (3M-14 Kalibr),” Missile Threat CSIS Missile Defense Project, accessed on October 
1, 2020, https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/ss-n-30a/.  
178 Office of Naval Intelligence, The Russian Navy: A Historic Transition (Washington, D.C.: Office 
of Naval Intelligence, December 2015), 36, https://www.oni.navy.mil/Portals/12/Intel%20agencies/russia/
Russia%202015print.pdf?ver=2015-12-14-082038-923.  
Type NATO Name Number In Service (# of VLS/Torpedo Tubes) per Fleet 











SSGN Severodvinsk (Yasen) 0 0 0 0 0 
SSGN Yasen-M 3 (96) 0 0 3 (96) 0 
SSGN Oscar II 2 (64) 0 0 2 (64) 0 
SSGN Akula IV 2 (64) 0 0 2 (64) 0 
SS Kilo (Project 877M) 0 0 0 0 0 
SS Kilo (Project 636.6) 0 0 0 6 (36) 0 
SS Lada 0 0 2 (12) 0 0 
CGN Kirov 1 (80) 0 0 1 (80) 0 
DDG Udaloy I 0 0 0 1 (16) 0 
DDG Udaloy II 0 0 0 0 0 
FFG Gorshkov 3 (48) 0 0 0 0 
FFG Krivak II 0 1 (8) 0 0 0 
FFG Steregushchy I 0 0 0 2 (16) 0 
FFG Steregushchy II 1 (8) 0 0 0 0 
FFG Gepard 0 0 0 0 0 
PGG  Karakurt 0 9 (72) 3 (24) 6 (48) 0 
PGG Sviyazhsk 0 5 (40) 0 0 0 
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N-30 LACM is capable of carrying conventional or nuclear warheads and can reach targets 
within 300 km to 1,500 km (161 nm to 810 nm).179  There are two versions of the 91R 
ASROC, a weapon with a longer range and quicker speeds than conventional torpedoes: 
the 91RE1 is a submarine-launched ASROC with a range of up to 50 km (27 nm); the 
91RTE2 is a ship-launched ASROC with a range of up to 40 km (22 nm).180   
The Kalibr-M missile, currently in developmental stages, is the upgraded version 
of the Kalibr-NK SS-N-30A SAGARIS (3M-14 Kalibr) and does present a credible threat 
to the United States, its global interests, and the United States Navy if its purported 
capabilities are true. The Kalibr-M has been advertised to have a maximum firing range of 
4,500 km (~2,430 nm), flying at 2.5 Mach (3,000 km/hour or 1,620 nm/hour) and is 
intended to compete with the U.S. Navy’s Block IV TLAM-E cruise missile which has a 
maximum firing range of 1,700 km (~918 nm) at 880 km/hour (~475 nm/hour).181    
The first operational use of the Kalibr-system was observed in October 2015 as a 
RFN frigate and two corvettes launched over 25 missiles into Syria from the Caspian Sea 
and follow-on launches into Syria from RFN Kilo (Project 636) nuclear-powered 
submarine (SSNs) in the eastern Mediterranean Sea (December 2015 and March 2017).182   
The use of conventional precision weapons and their role in strategic deterrence is 
noteworthy due to their instrumentality. According to Dave Johnson’s analysis of the role 
and use of conventional precision weapons, he concludes that conventional weapons have 
been assigned the same roles that nuclear weapons hold and have held in the evolving 
approaches to strategic deterrence.183  Conventional precision weapons, such as the Kalibr 
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family of missiles, have been assigned to “deter by the threat of infliction of deterrent, 
prescribed or ‘dosed’ levels, or unacceptable levels of damage on an adversary.”184  
Moreover, President Putin has said that conventional, high precision weapons will “take 
strategic nonnuclear forces to a qualitatively new level, enabling the neutralization of any 
military threat to Russia” (Figure 3).185  Falling under the category of a non-nuclear 
strategic weapon, the Kalibr missile “remains an integral element in the evolving Russian 
military strategy, combining a set of cross-domain deterrence options, including strategic 
and nonstrategic nuclear, strategic conventional, and nonmilitary ways and means.”186 
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1,000 nm range rings from fleet concentration areas. 
Figure 3. Kalibr SS-N-30A SAGARIS LACM Ranges187 
 
187 Source: ONI, The Russian Navy, 35. 
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IV. AN EXAMINATION OF RUSSIAN FEDERATION REGIONAL 
POLICIES AND NAVAL OPERATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION  
This chapter will examine Russia’s regional strategies and/or policies for the 
Mediterranean Sea, Black Sea, and the Arctic Ocean while considering Russia’s expanded 
approach and definition of ‘strategic deterrence.’  For the purposes of this chapter and to 
reiterate, The Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation has outlined its maritime 
regional priority areas: The Atlantic Regional Priority Area (includes the Atlantic Ocean, 
the Baltic, the Black, the Mediterranean Sea and Sea of Azov) and The Arctic Regional 
Priority Area.188  This chapter will then identify and analyze select RFN regional 
operations to determine if they have been executed as an extension of the aforementioned 
strategies, doctrines, and policies and also to identify their operational mission and/or 
goals. Further, this chapter will determine the effectiveness of the RFN at achieving its 
primary mission of strategic deterrence. 
B. THE MEDITERRANEAN SEA  
This section will discuss the Mediterranean Sea and elements of the Black Sea 
Fleet, (BSF) as many of the RFN platforms deployed to the Mediterranean Sea are forward 
from the BSF and RFN operations are typically directed by Black Sea RFN commanders.  
1. Russia and the Mediterranean Sea: A Background 
To introduce the current Russian interest in the Mediterranean Sea, it is important 
to understand its past significance to the former Soviet Union and how that relevance has 
informed current Russian perceptions about, and interest in, the Mediterranean Sea. Dating 
back to Stalin’s post-WWII policy, as noted by Carey Joynt and Oles Smolansky, strategic 
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considerations regarding the Mediterranean can be assumed by Soviet “attempts to improve 
Russia’s strategic position by acquiring or effectively controlling the Turkish Straits area 
and to strengthen that position through the acquisition of the Dodecanese Islands and 
Tripolitania.”189  Stalin sought to establish the Soviet Union as a Mediterranean Power as 
NATO was being formed (1949) as a formal alliance. One of the United States’ responses 
to Soviet belligerence was establishing the Sixth Fleet and securing a permanent presence 
in the Mediterranean.190  The Soviet Navy, however, was not able to respond in kind or 
ability to U.S. Navy Mediterranean forces until 1958, when the USSR naval forces 
completed their first extended (but logistically limited) deployment to the 
Mediterranean.191  Yet, by 1964, the Soviet navy was able to maintain a continuous 
presence in the Mediterranean, and by 1969, owing largely to Soviet support to the Arabs’ 
natures during the 1967 Six-Day War, Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean 
markedly expanded.192  Between 1966 and 1971, the Soviet naval presence in the 
Mediterranean expanded by over 300%, with an average daily strength between 50 to 54 
support and combatant vessels.193 
Throughout the 1970s, Soviet relationships and port access with Mediterranean 
countries shifted in strength from Egypt to Syria (via ports in Tartus and Latakia) and 
included naval visits to Libya and Algeria.194  Soviet naval presence peaked in 1973 with 
an average daily strength of 56 vessels, but by 1977 and the years to follow, the average 
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daily strength fell to 45 vessels.195  Soviet naval presence remained active throughout the 
1980s and, according to American scholar Milan Vego, were primarily employed in 
gatekeeping operations and the surveillance of U.S. and NATO naval operations.196  
Additionally, Soviet forces were willing to assist in efforts for which they could plausibly 
deny presence and/or which could be executed with minimal degree of exposure. An 
example of such would be supporting Libya in 1985–1986 against U.S. naval and air 
operations, which established the Soviet position and willingness to undermine U.S. 
presence and operations throughout the Mediterranean.197 
After 1985, however, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union, Mikhail Gorbachev relaxed the aforementioned stance against U.S. operations in 
the Mediterranean, a residual effect of his ‘new thinking’ approach to relations with the 
United States; he emphasized political accommodation over expansive military power as 
the answer to the ‘East-West’ military competition.198  During the final years of Soviet 
Union, Moscow’s political and military approach toward the Middle East and the 
Mediterranean was to promote Soviet objectives without estranging the United States.199  
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the dire economic straits during President 
Yeltin’s administration, the RFN did not deploy to the Mediterranean throughout the 1990s 
and would not resume Mediterranean operations until the 2000s.200 
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2. The RFN in the Mediterranean Sea: Basing 
The decision by Russia to re-establish a military presence and return to the 
Mediterranean was announced by then Prime Minister Vladimir Putin in November 
1999.201  As described in Chapter III, this goal was also codified in Russia’s Naval Policy 
in which the primary objective of the RFN is to “deter military conflicts and implement 
strategic deterrence” by securing a permanent naval presence in the Mediterranean Sea, 
including the vital sea lines of communication.202  Then, in 2006, the Russian newspaper 
Kommersant reported Kremlin’s plans to upgrade the Syrian port of Tartus and transform 
it into a modern and fully-fledged naval base.203  The Tartus port in Syria, as argued by 
Derek Lutterbeck and Georgij Engelbrecht, is viewed by Russian leadership as a “strategic 
gateway for Russia’s Navy, ensuring its access, not only to the Mediterranean but also to 
other important maritime spaces such as the Atlantic (via the Strait of Gibraltar), the Red 
Sea and the Horn of Africa,” a move that can be assessed as an effort to rebalance the 
Mediterranean against the United States.204  Moreover, on December 29, 2017, President 
Putin ratified an agreement that expanded RFN operations at Tartus Naval Base in Syria. 
This agreement approves expansion of the Tartus Naval Base, but also allows Russia to 
have up to 11 warships (to include nuclear-powered vessels) at the base for a period for 49 
years, rent-free.205  Therefore, it can be expected that Russia will seek to maintain its naval 
presence in the Mediterranean and possibly work to solidify relationships with other 
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nations in the Mediterranean and Levant regions, which further enable Russian strategic 
interests and goals. 
3. The RFN in the Mediterranean Sea: Operations and Exercises 
The RFN return to the Mediterranean Sea began in late-2007 in the form of the 
largest RFN deployment to the area since the fall of the Soviet Union. The 71-day 
deployment was led by the RFN’s only aircraft carrier, Admiral Kuznetsov, with a battle 
group of 11 units from Russia’s Northern, Baltic, and Black Sea Fleets.206  This 
deployment, as declared by RFN Vice-Admiral Nikolai Maksimov, was a signal that 
Russia “will establish a permanent presence in the region.”207  The symbolic ‘success’ of 
this 2007–2008 deployment initiated a new era of RFN deployments, one in which the 
Tartus port would serve as the RFN’s permanent Eastern Mediterranean base and become 
a primary operating area for the new, Kalibr-capable surface and submarine platforms 
homeported in Sevastopol, Ukraine (though Russia has since annexed and claimed the 
Crimean Peninsula naval base as its own.) 
In 2013, the RFN executed its largest exercise in the Mediterranean since the 2007–
2008 Kuznetsov deployment. According to Dmitry Gorenburg, senior research scientist at 
the Center for Naval Analysis, the deployment, which included over twenty ships from 
three RFN fleets (Northern, Baltic Sea, and Black Sea), signaled several goals of the 
Russian Federation. Gorenburg concludes that “The Russian military has long sought to 
restore its presence in the region and has in the last 5–6 years taken numerous opportunities 
to send ships to the region to engage in exercises and conduct port visits. This exercise, 
first and foremost, is simply an expansion of this effort.”208  Shortly after the conclusion 
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of the deployment, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu stressed that the 
“Mediterranean region was the core of all essential dangers to Russia’s national interests 
and that continued fallout from the Arab Spring increased the importance of this 
region…he then showcased a new Russian naval policy by announcing the decision to 
establish a Russian Navy task force in the Mediterranean on a permanent basis.”209 
Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu’s declaration came to fruition with 
Russia’s 2014 reestablishment of the RFN Mediterranean squadron and the 2015 military 
intervention in Syria.210  Once limited by legacy Soviet platforms, the RFN Mediterranean 
squadron was greatly impacted by Russia’s modernization efforts. As confirmed by the 
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA): 
Beginning in 2014 after the occupation of Crimea, new units began to enter 
the order of battle, including modern coastal missiles and naval infantry. 
Then in 2015, new submarines and surface combatants began to arrive to 
bolster the fleet. Now armed with the KALIBR missile system, the Black 
Sea Fleet is a significant force in the region and over the next few years 
could have as many as six new attack submarines and six new surface ships, 
which can not only exert control on the Black Sea, but can operate in the 
Mediterranean to counter NATO forces and support operations in Syria.211 
The Mediterranean squadron is primarily comprised from the Black Sea Fleet (BSF)—of 
which are Kalibr-capable (refer to Appendix Tables 13 and 44).212   
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The BSF, the most modernized, combined surface and subsurface fleet of the RFN, 
has changed the way the RFN operates in the Mediterranean Sea. As part of Russia’s 
expanded definition of strategic deterrence and the application of strategic deterrence for 
the RFN in the Mediterranean is relegated to a coastal defense mission and the creation of 
an A2/AD bubble in the Eastern Mediterranean.213 
These A2/AD bubbles “form a set of layered defenses and multiple vectors 
of attack through the combination of long-range sea-, air-, and ground-
launched missiles to deny  access, with shorter-range coastal and air 
defense systems focused on area denial…the RFN will seek to establish 
credible maritime conventional deterrence against NATO through the 
combination of air defenses and cruise missile-equipped ships, which will 
work together to highlight that any use of NATO naval forces against 
Russian ships and adversaries would be highly costly for the adversary.214 
Since the re-establishment of the Mediterranean squadron, there has been a standing RFN 
presence and consistent exercises and operations in the Mediterranean, including Kalibr 
and other surface-to-surface missile launches into Syria from the Eastern Mediterranean. 
4. Conclusion 
While Russia has not articulated a specific policy to address its interests in the 
Mediterranean, through the RFN’s objectives and missions we have ascertained Russia’s 
intentions. As assessed by Dmitry Gorenburg, “Russia is expanding its naval presence in 
the Eastern Mediterranean because it’s easier than trying to compete with the United States 
on the world’s oceans;” this sentiment is also a stated goal of expanded strategic deterrence 
and the codified security strategy, military doctrine, and the naval policy.215  In his analysis 
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of the new Russian naval policy, Richard Connolly observes that it “signaled the intentions 
of the Russian leadership to maintain a permanent naval presence in the eastern 
Mediterranean in support of wider Russian foreign and security objectives” which echoes 
Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu’s declaration. Connolly observes, however, that 
the exact intentions of Russia’s Mediterranean policy remain unclear. He notes, “Russia’s 
recent actions in the region suggest the eastern Mediterranean (i.e., the area near Syria), 
but it is possible that the region enjoys a broader meaning in Russian thinking.”216   
Russia has been able to re-establish a permanent presence in the Mediterranean 
which is instrumental to supporting and achieving its foreign policy goals (as described in 
Chapter III). The RFN’s Mediterranean squadron has demonstrated Russia’s willingness 
to place RFN forces in combat and deterrence roles to support its strategic deterrence and 
national security interests. It can be expected, therefore, that Russia will continue its anti-
U.S./NATO posturing and work to undermine the U.S./NATO presence in the 
Mediterranean, especially as more modern and updated RFN platforms are ushered into the 
area. Dave Johnson has opined that “Russia’s approach to conflict undeniably includes 
political, diplomatic, economic, non-linear, and hybrid means below the level of armed 
conflict which can be employed in a gradual campaign, exploiting ambiguity to achieve 
strategic objectives without military violence.”217  Johnson’s assessment of Russia’s 
combat actions from the Mediterranean and basing and infrastructure developments in 
Syria indicate Russia’s effort and, to a degree, success in building its reputation to become 
a regional power player, counter to that of NATO and the U.S. However, the economic and 
political hurdles facing the Russian Federation are undoubtedly going to affect operations 
in the Mediterranean, although not to the extent that they will completely remove Russian 
influence in the coming decades. Furthermore, the growing utilization of RFN platforms, 
especially Kalibr-capable platforms, in the Mediterranean Sea signals implementation of 
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Russian Naval Policy goals in which the RFN shall secure a permanent naval presence and 
“implement strategic deterrence”: the Black Sea (special attention on maintaining control 
of the Crimean Peninsula), the Mediterranean Sea, the Arctic, and vital sea lines of 
communication.218   
C. RUSSIA AND THE BLACK SEA 
The Turkish Straits (consisting of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus Straits), 
connecting the Black and Mediterranean Seas, are critical strategic access points for 
Russia’s economy, power projection, and security. The Soviet BSF was headquartered at 
Sevastopol, Ukraine, and when the Soviet Union collapsed, 82 percent of the BSF was 
purchased by Russia, but remained ported in Sevastopol.219  Moreover, the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and the inclusion of post-Soviet and post-Warsaw pact countries into NATO 
compromised Russia’s perception of security on its shared borders with eastern Europe. 
Between 1999 and 2004, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia all became official members of NATO, 
essentially surrounding Russia’s western border.220  NATO then began an enhanced 
relationship with Ukraine and Georgia. Georgia, in 2004, became the first country to 
execute the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP), a strategically important system of 
cooperation dealing with the reforms that took place in the country, and in 2006, NATO 
offered Intensified Dialogue with Georgia.221  Then, in April 2008, NATO leaders agreed 
that Ukraine would become a NATO member in the future (Figure 4).222  In 2009, wanting 
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stronger ties with the West and NATO, Ukraine said it would not extend Russia’s lease of 
the naval base in Sevastopol, Ukraine (Crimean Peninsula), set to expire in 2017.223  
Russia, therefore, stood to lose its primary Black Sea naval base and was facing growing 
NATO presence on its southern flank.  
 
Figure 4. NATO Member Nations and Countries Promised Membership224 
In August 2008, Russia invaded Georgia for a period of five days with the following 
objectives: 
1. Expel Georgian troops and effectively terminating Georgian sovereignty 
in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. 
2. Prevent Georgia from joining NATO. 
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3. Increase its control of the Caucasus, especially over strategic energy 
pipelines.  
4. Recreate a sphere of influence in the former Soviet Union and beyond.225 
Then, in 2014, on the brink of losing its Sevastopol naval base following the collapse of 
the pro-Russian government regime in Ukraine, Russia annexed the Crimean Peninsula.226 
1. RFN and the Black Sea 
Since the 2014 annexation of the Crimean Peninsula, the BSF has built-up quite 
substantially to include Russia’s newest and most capable surface and subsurface vessels, 
particularly because they are equipped with the conventional weapons systems (such as the 
Kalibr system). That has, to a degree, achieved Russia’s goal of strategic deterrence with 
the incorporation of conventional capabilities to deter adversaries and achieve Military 
Doctrine goals of countering NATO build-up in the region and adversarial deployments in 
the areas contiguous to Russia.227  As mentioned previously, RFN modernization efforts 
brought the BSF six new surface vessels, six new submarines, and upgraded legacy 
platforms, making the BSF the largest and most capable force in the region. 
As with the Mediterranean Sea, Russia created an A2/AD bubble in the Black Sea 
or, as argued in a study by the Center for Naval Analysis, created a southern strategic 
bastion, a duplicate to the existing Northern Strategic Bastion (discussed in following 
sections of this chapter).228  While unlike the Northern Strategic Bastion, the BSF lacks 
nuclear weapons or nuclear submarines, it has expanded strategic deterrence via 
conventional weapons. In order to project power beyond Russia’s coastlines and to “lock 
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Russia’s southern flank,” the Southern Strategic Bastion implements conventional 
deterrence and would include the Mediterranean squadron in key roles of southern 
defense.229 
Igor Delanoe, the Deputy-Head of the French-Russian Analytical Center, believes 
that the BSF’s aims and goals are to prevent further NATO and Western expansion in the 
Southern Strategic region, a direct correlation to Russia’s current Maritime Doctrine, in 
which NATO expansion is considered one of the greatest external threats to Russian 
security and stability.230  Moreover, the capabilities and capacities of the BSF are designed 
to be superior to any naval group that operates in the Black Sea—particularly NATO 
vessels which, from Moscow’s view, are perceived as hostile.231  The enhancement of the 
BSF with Kalibr-capable surface and submarine vessels allows Moscow to fulfill its 
regional superiority goals to achieve the A2/AD advantage in the Black Sea (Figure 5). 
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Deployed RFN vessels extend threat envelopes based on ship and submarine positions and 
deployed weapon systems 
Figure 5. Russia’s Black Sea Southern Strategic Bastion232 
Regarding RFN and aviation order of battle, it should also be noted that with the 
2014 annexation of Crimea, and more specifically Sevastopol, the balance of power within 
the maritime domain shifted in favor of Russia. Subsequent interactions of U.S., NATO, 
and Ukrainian vessels with Russian naval vessels and aircraft have been increasingly 
contentious, citing several United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea (UNCLOS) 
violations.233  Further, in a June 2017 commentary, Thomas Frear of the European 
Leadership Network identified a trend in which U.S. actions in Syria (specifically the June 
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18, 2017 shootdown of a Syrian fighter jet) were met by a Russian response in the Baltic 
Sea:  
A Russian jet flew within 1.5 meters of a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft,” and 
concluded,  in a 2018 policy brief that “the close passes of NATO, 
predominantly U.S., aircraft and ships operating in proximity to sensitive 
areas such as Kaliningrad or Crimea have been linked by the Russian 
Ministry of Defence (sic) to the defence (sic) of Russian airspace, indicating 
a desire to project this defence (sic) out over the high seas…and must be 
viewed as having been intended to signal a political or military message.234   
This instance is not the first of its kind and may be indicative of future retaliatory and/or 
strategic messaging directed toward U.S., NATO, and/or Western states across Russia’s 
regions of interest (Table 9). 
2. Conclusion 
Like in the Mediterranean Sea, Russia does not maintain a codified strategy or 
policy for RFN operations in the Black Sea. The BSF remains the most ‘Kalibrized’ fleets 
of the RFN, owing largely to NSS2015 goals, expanded ‘strategic deterrence,’ and the 
geographic necessity of platforms to operate more in littoral waters than open ocean.235  
The BSF is considered quite agile and formidable enough to manage and counter U.S. and 
NATO naval vessels that may deploy to the Black Sea, especially as part of the Southern 
Strategic Bastion. The overwhelming RFN presence in the Black Sea provides Russia with 
a regional hegemony able to provide security and counter threats as they appear. The Black 
Sea provides the necessary gateway to the Mediterranean Sea and BSF build-up and power 
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projection can be applied to the Mediterranean as Russia expands its reach beyond its on 
coastal regions. 
Table 9. Russia-West Incidents in the Air and Sea, 2014–2017236 
Russia - U.S. and/or NATO Military Encounters (2014-2017) 
DATE Interaction Description 
April 13, 
2014 
In the Black Sea, a Russian Su-24 FENCER made 12 passes; flying within 1,000 yards at 500 
feet ASL of the USS DONALD COOK (DDG 75). A breach of Article IV of the 1972 bilateral 
US-Russia INCSEA agreement. 
July 18, 
2014 
An U.S. RC-135 reconnaissance plane operating near Kaliningrad had to take evasive action 
after being approached by Russian fighter aircraft. 
January 
19, 2016 
Fighters flying under the NATO Baltic air-policing mission intercepted a Russian Il-20 
intelligence aircraft flying from Kaliningrad to mainland Russia over the Baltic Sea. The 
Russian aircraft had not filed flight plans, did not respond to communication attempts, and 
had disengaged its transponder. 
January 
25, 2016 
A Russian Su-27 military jet intercepted an American RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft in 
international airspace over the Black Sea, at one point coming within 5 meters of the other 
plane. The incident was described as unsafe and unprofessional by American officials. 
April 11, 
2016 
Russian Su-24s and a helicopter buzzed and conducted dangerous maneuvers in close 
proximity to USS DONALD COOK (DDG 75) while operating in the Baltic Sea. The Russian 
jet came within 30 feet of the DDG and the flight path was described as a “simulated attack.”  
A breach of Article III of the US-Russia INCSEA agreement. 
April 12, 
2016 
Two Russian Ka-27 Helix helicopters made passes of the USS DONALD COOK in the Baltic 
Sea while apparently taking photographs. 40 minutes later, two unarmed Russian Su-24 jets 
made 11 close passes to the ship. Both incidents were described as unsafe and unprofessional 
by American officials. The U.S. embassy in Moscow issued a formal protest over the events. 
April 29, 
2016 
A Russian Su-24 military jet barrel-rolled over an American RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft 
in an incident that was described as unsafe and unprofessional by American military officials, 
at one point coming within 8 meters of the other aircraft. Russian officials stated that their 
pilots behaved appropriately and that the United States was at fault 
February 
10, 2017 
The USS PORTER (DDG 78) was buzzed by four Russian aircraft while operating in 
international waters in the Black Sea in an incident described as “unsafe and unprofessional” 
by American officials. Two Su-24 fighter jets passed over the ship, followed at different points 
in the day by one Il-38, then another Su-24 jet, the closest within 200 yards of the ship. 
March 24, 
2017 
Nine Russian bombers participated in what was described as simulated attacks against 
Norwegian radar arrays in Vardø that are used by NATO. They were described as “conducting 
offensive profiles” prior to turning away from Norwegian airspace. 
June 19, 
2017 
A Russian Su-27 fighter jet intercepted an American RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft in 
international airspace over the Baltic Sea, at one point flying within 1.5 meters of the other 
aircraft. The Russian jet was noted as being armed and accused of flying erratically by 
American officials. Russian officials accused the RC-135 pilot of behaving irresponsibly 
during the incident. One day prior, Russia declared that American planes flying in certain 
parts of Syria would be considered acceptable targets following the downing of a Syrian jet 
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Russia - U.S. and/or NATO Military Encounters (2014-2017) 




One Russian Su-30 fighter jet intercepted an U.S. P-8A reconnaissance aircraft flying in 
international airspace over the Black Sea. The Russian jet came within 15 meters of the 
American aircraft and flew in such a way to force the other aircraft to change course and 
experience turbulence. The American aircraft’s transponder was engaged prior to the incident. 
A Pentagon spokesman described the Russian pilot’s behavior as “unsafe.” A statement by 
the Russian government claimed that the P-8A was approaching Russian airspace at high 
speed. 
Not a comprehensive list of all interactions 
 
D. RUSSIA AND THE ARCTIC ZONE 
The Arctic is the only region in which Russia maintains a regionally-defined policy. 
Outside of the importance for the RFN Northern Fleet, Russia’s interests in the Arctic 
maritime domain are largely economic. As then Prime Minister Medvedev declared in 
2018, Russia plans to continue Arctic navigation and developing North Sea routes as it will 
“create developmental support zones necessary for the industrialization of the region…to 
unlock great economic potential.”237  Russia relies on the Arctic for economic stability—
specifically reliant on energy exports that are extracted in the Arctic. “Russia is the world’s 
largest producer of crude oil and the second-largest producer of dry natural gas…Russia’s 
economy is highly dependent on its hydrocarbons, and oil and natural , gas revenues 
account for more than one-third of the federal budget revenues.”238  Exploration and 
extraction of Arctic resources is critical to its gross domestic product (GDP) and its exports;  
the Arctic zone has only 1% of Russia’s population, but touts 22% of its exports and 11% 
of its GDP.239    
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However, the global recession, lower energy prices, and imposed western sanctions 
on Russia resulting from its 2014 annexation of the Crimean Peninsula, dramatically 
impacted Russia’s economy and ability to extract and develop its offshore Arctic energy 
projects.240  In 2015, 43% of Russia’s state revenues came from oil and gas sales, and 
following the crash in energy prices, revenue was down to 36% in 2016.241  The combined 
economic crash and imposed sanctions have put Russia into a position for which its 
economy may be in more dire straits.242  The culminating effects may therefore force 
Russia to potentially take a more aggressive posture to salvage and protect its economic 
interests in the Arctic. While there have not been any dramatic showings of force and, for 
the most part, all states with equity in Arctic claims have used prescribed United Nations 
procedural mechanisms to assert such claims, the strategic environment deserves increased 
attention and strategic planning from the United States and its NATO partners.  
Russia, in its 2008 Russian Federation’s Policy for the Arctic to 2020, has defined 
its objectives and strategy in the Arctic: 
1. Internationally: Russia regards the Arctic region as a location to reassert 
its power and prestige—preferring dialogue and cooperation to armed 
conflict—but takes a more defensive posture in the area. 
2. Security: Russia wants to assert territorial sovereignty along its borders of 
the Arctic Zone. Russia desires to secure transport and shipping routes and 
prepare for potential threats to their sovereignty. 
3. Economically/Domestically: As mentioned above, Russia would like to 
explore and also revive economic and resource development in the 
Arctic.243 
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The United States Office of Naval Intelligence has assessed the situation and expects to 
observe an increased Russian emphasis on its periphery in the Arctic as an extension of its 
alleged continental shelf rights and economic protectionary measures (Figure 6).244   
 
Figure 6. Arctic Territorial Claims245 
1. The RFN and the Arctic Zone 
The Arctic is especially significant when discussing the RFN. The Arctic is the 
home to Russia’s strategic nuclear naval forces. Russian military presence and strategy in 
the Arctic can be summed up in three main goals: asserting Russian sovereignty in the 
region; protecting Russia’s economic interests in the High North; and demonstrating that 
Russia remains a great power with world-class military capabilities. The RFN’s role in this 
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demonstrative power is with its strategic nuclear submarines and naval patrols and 
exercises.246  In 2008, the RFN expanded their operations in the Arctic by resuming surface 
combatant presence and increasing the operational radius of the Northern Fleet 
submarines.247  The Northern Fleet is responsible for defending the Arctic region and is 
the primary strategic deterrence fleet with four SSGNs and eight SSBNs; the Northern 
Fleet is the heart of Russian bastion layered defense.248  James Lacey, writing in War on 
the Rocks, contends that Russian bastions are now being employed for operational/strategic 
offensive objectives, under the protection of long-range precision weapons. The “anti-
access/area denial capabilities are increasingly employed to support wider operational and 
strategic thinking…to tilt regional balances of power and extend their global influence.”249  
Russia also has growing fears of encirclement and containment and their strategy in the 
Arctic links to Russia’s overall national security. The Russian military’s primary goals are 
to protect and defend Russia’s national frontiers in the Arctic zone and to maintain the 
lethality of the Russian Federation’s armed forces in the region.250  This warning, while 
not a declaration of conflict, does indicate a Russian willingness to use military 
intimidation or threat of force which, inherently, increases tension and the risk of 
miscalculation.  
Yet, in contrast with the Soviet-era confrontational posture in the Arctic, the current 
guiding documents seem to favor cooperation and coordination, at least in documentation, 
but not necessarily practice. The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation states 
that the Arctic is a region where Russia must “promote peace, stability and constructive 
international cooperation” but will also “be firm in countering any attempts to introduce 
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elements of political or military confrontation in the Arctic.”251  Russia’s recent actions in 
the Arctic demonstrate their intended goals, but regarding cooperation, “Moscow is acting 
defensively during a time of heightened tensions with neighboring countries and as a result, 
is building its security in the region.”252   
Further supporting this contradiction in policy versus military activity is the 2014 
Russian Military of Defense, proclamation stating that Russia intends on stationing forces, 
on a permanent basis, along its entire Arctic coast.253  Katarzyna Zysk of the Norwegian 
Institute for Defense Studies highlighted that, contrary to a rather cooperation-focused 
Arctic policy, Russia has expanded its Arctic military infrastructure, added modernized 
weapons systems, and used Arctic military exercises and military capabilities displays to 
further communicate their power and determination to influence any potential adversarial 
forces or nations and to strengthen Russian deterrence.254  While the BSF is currently the 
most modernized RFN fleet, the Northern Fleet, based in the Arctic, is from where Russia’s 
strategic nuclear submarine forces operate and deploy, and great efforts have been made to 
modernize and develop the Northern Fleet platforms, infrastructure, and command and 
control to an ensure expedient retaliatory capability. The Arctic must remain absolutely 
safe to ensure Russian survivability of its nuclear deterrence forces.255  Russia’s efforts in 
the Arctic have galvanized in a zero-sum threat perception of the area. Russia has a 
perception that they could face regional symmetric and asymmetric security challenges due 
to the international and economic interest in the Arctic.256 
 
251 Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, (Moscow, Russia: The Kremlin, 2016), 
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Final (Arlington, VA: CAN, Corp., September 2020), 2, https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/IOP-2020-
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2. RFN Northern Fleet Bastion Defense 
Russia has been observed to be returning to its Cold War tactics across its fleets, 
specifically the concept of Bastion Defense (also referred to as A2/AD bubble in previous 
sections), in which Russia secures its defined strategic territory and ensures its own 
freedom of operation.257  The concept of the Bastion Defense was re-introduced in the 
1990s with the aim of ensuring submarine survivability so they (the submarines) could 
provide strategic operations; this concept also concentrated the large part of the sea-based 
force with the Northern Fleet and centers on defending sea-based nuclear assets.258 
The Bastion concept seeks to ensure both the security of the Kola Peninsula 
and access of the Northern Fleet to the North Atlantic and beyond. It makes 
the distinction between ‘inner defence’(sic), which relates to ambition of 
control, and ‘outer defence’ (sic), for ambition of denial. The concept also 
involves creating space for sea control and sea denial activities.”259  “The 
‘bastion’ concept—strategic submarines equipped with ballistic nuclear 
missiles stationed in northern waters, protected by a defensive perimeter 
stretching to the Greenland, Iceland and United Kingdom (GIUK) gap 
[Figures 7 and 8].260 
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Figure 7. The Reach of Russia’s Bastion Defense Concept261 
 




Figure 8. The Reach of Russia’s Bastion Defense Concept: Missiles Systems 
– Position and Range262 
As highlighted by Michael Melino and Heather A. Conley, Russia’s military 
posture in the Arctic emphasizes early warning and defense for it’s air and maritime forces 
to the extent that Russia has established a new strategic command for the Arctic zone 
underneath the Northern Fleet,  refurbished and/or reopened fifty previously closed Soviet 
military ports in the Arctic, and deployed to the region for exercises and training, as 
follows:263  
∑ Vostok-18 (September 2018): Conducted in eastern Russia and parts of 
the Bering Sea. It involved 300,000 troops; the largest military exercise 
conducted by Russia since 1981. 
 
262 Source: Rolf Tamnes, “The Significance of the North Atlantic and the Norwegian Distribution,” 
23. 
263 Melino and Conley, The Ice Curtain: Russia’s Arctic Military Presence. 
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∑ Ocean Shield Exercise (August 2019): Russia exercised its Bastion 
Defense capabilities—the Northern Fleet entered the Northern Sea and 
engaged in live-fire demonstrations in the Norwegian Sea. These efforts 
demonstrate a clear forward line of defense to secure the GIUK-N gap and 
block the English Channel. The purpose of these exercises is to display 
Russia’s ability to project power beyond its Arctic waters and assert 
maritime control. 
∑ Tsentr-19 (September 2019): The Northern Fleet conducted several 
exercises in the Arctic which incorporated newly designed Arctic military 
equipment. Significant military drills also took place between the Arctic 
archipelagos of Novaya Zemlya and the New Siberian Islands. 
∑ Grom-19 (October 2019): Tested Russia’s strategic nuclear triad—
included ten Russian submarines (8x were nuclear-powered) patrolling the 
GIUK gap—involved the launching of t wo nuclear warheads in the 
Barents Sea and several other ballistic missiles.264 
E. RUSSIA AND THE ATLANTIC OCEAN 
Regarding Russian naval activity in the Atlantic Ocean,  the U.S. Department of 
Defense recently released information depicting an increase in Russian naval operations in 
the vicinity of the United States (Figure 9).265  Commander, United States Second Fleet, 
Vice Admiral Andrew Lewis, during a February 4, 2020 presentation at the U.S. Naval 
Institute and Center for Strategic and International Studies, stated that the United States 
Navy “no longer considers the East Coast of the United States as an uncontested area or an 
automatic safe haven for its ships and submarines…we have seen an ever-increasing 
number of Russian submarines deployed in the Atlantic, and these submarines are more 
capable than ever, deploying for longer periods of time, with more lethal weapons 
 
264 Melino and Conley, The Ice Curtain: Russia’s Arctic Military Presence. 
265 Joseph Trevithick, “New Pentagon Map Shows Huge Scale of Worrisome Russian and Chinese 
Naval Operations,” The War Zone, last updated February 10, 2020, https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-
zone/32145/new-pentagon-map-shows-huge-scale-of-worrisome-russian-and-chinese-naval-operations.  
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systems.”266  The deployments of advanced Russian submarines and intelligence 
collection ships from Russia’s Northern Fleet point to Russian subversive efforts aim to 
weaken transatlantic unity and emphasize the scope (and not necessarily the scale) of RFN 
operations.267  That is to say, the nature of these operations—such as RFN underwater 
activity near undersea cables—is more alarming than the increase in the number of 
deployed platforms and patrols. As part of the naval component of strategic deterrence, the 
plan is to increase patrols of Kalibr-capable platforms in support of the Kremlin’s interests 
or the defense of its foreign partners. As argued by Joseph Trevithick, an extension of the 
model Russia as applied in Syria could be extended to other strategically important 
areas.268 
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Figure 9. Russian and Chinese Naval Activity (with Locations of Major 
Undersea Cables)269 
For the prospect of future operations, according to The Russian Way of Warfare, 
the blue-water capable submarines and surface vessels, which regularly conduct out-of-
area operations, are limited in number, and therefore focus their operations on strategically 
valuable areas in the Arctic, parts of the Atlantic, the eastern Mediterranean, and the Black 
Sea, but currently are assessed to serve in a supporting role in a conventional conflict 
(Figure 10).270  While influenced by Soviet military ancestry, Russia can no longer rely on 
the massive manpower advantages it previously enjoyed. Yet, as contended, Russia’s 
leaders have demonstrated increasingly conventional options, that even though delayed in 
 
269 Source: Joseph Trevithick, “New Pentagon Map Shows Huge Scale of Worrisome Russian and 
Chinese Naval Operations.” 
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construction, evidence the challenges for potential adversaries in an evolving and dynamic 
operational environment.271   
 
Figure 10. Russian KALIBR (SS-N-30A SAGARIS) Cruise Missile Threat to 
U.S. East Coast272 
  
 
271 Boston and Massicot, The Russian Way of Warfare, 12. 
272 Source: “SS-N-30A (3M-14 Kalibr),” Missile Threat CSIS Missile Defense Project, accessed on 
October 1, 2020, https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/ss-n-30a/. 
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V. CONCLUSION: ANALYSIS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 
NAVY AS AN INSTRUMENT OF STRATEGIC DETERRENCE AND 
AN OUTLOOK ON FUTURE RUSSIAN NAVAL OPERATIONS AND 
ADVANCEMENT 
This study has discussed the evolution of Russia’s approach to and definition of 
strategic deterrence and how the current definition has shaped Russia’s principal security, 
military, maritime, and naval policies and doctrines.  This thesis has also identified how 
Russia’s current approach to strategic deterrence has directed naval modernization efforts 
and operations. This chapter, therefore, will focus on analyzing the effectiveness of the 
RFN as an instrument of strategic deterrence based on the standards set forth by the Russian 
Naval Policy and offer an outlook for the RFN.  
The Russian Naval Policy has specific guidance on the use of the RFN as an 
effective instrument of strategic deterrence, including preventing global strike: 
1. Maintaining operational and combat capabilities of the Navy at a level that 
secures for it one of the leading positions in the world. 
2. Development and maintenance of the naval capability to strike ground 
targets of a potential enemy with conventional as well as nuclear weapons. 
3. Balanced development of the Navy to prevent exclusive superiority of the 
U.S. Navy and naval forces of other leading maritime powers over it. 
4. Ensuring continued presence of naval forces (troops) in strategically 
important maritime regions of the world’s ocean. 
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5. Establishing a modern border protection security system of the Russian 
Federation, ensuring a favorable environment in the maritime space and 
beyond.273   
It is these standards from which this thesis will evaluate the effectiveness of the RFN in its 
primary mission of strategic deterrence. This thesis offers the following conclusions 
regarding the RFN: (1) The RFN is unable to maintain the operational and combat 
capabilities to secure it a position as a naval leader in the world; (2) while the RFN has 
progressed in the development of naval weapons to strike ground targets, Russia does not 
have the necessary precision-strike (conventional and nuclear) capabilities to counter the 
full range of U.S./Western targets; (3) Russia has been unable to balance RFN development 
to prevent U.S. naval superiority; however, the RFN has been able to quickly field new 
and/or modernized naval platforms and weapons to strategic areas in which the United 
States has maintain historic naval superiority; (4) without quantifying a “continued 
presence of naval forces in strategically important maritime regions,” the RFN has been 
able to have a minimal but persistent presence in strategic (to Russia) maritime regions, 
but not so in the world’s oceans; (5) while Russian leaders have not qualified precisely 
what kind of modern border protection security system is necessary to ensure a favorable 
environment in the maritime space and beyond, analysis of RF political directives and RFN 
 
273 The Kremlin, Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Naval 
Operations for the Period Until 2030, 11. When using the RFN as an instrument of strategic deterrence, the 
primary objectives of how the RFN will achieve strategic deterrence are: “(1) continuous assessment and 
forecasting of the military-political situation on the World Ocean at the global and regional levels; (2) 
maintaining strategic stability on the World Ocean; (3) maintaining mission readiness of naval capabilities 
(forces) to deploy to strategically important areas of the World Ocean; (4) assurance of the capability of 
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concentration of joint capabilities (troops) on the territory of the Crimean Peninsula; (7) securing the 
permanent naval presence of the Russian Federation in the Mediterranean Sea and other strategically 
important areas of the World Ocean, including in the areas of vital sea lines of communication; (8) 
development of and support for operation of the unified state information system covering underwater and 
surface situations; (9) strengthening cooperation with foreign states in the field of international safety and 
security on the World Ocean; as well as development of military cooperation with them on the basis of 
common interests of strengthening international security according to the norms of international law; (10) 
conclusion and implementation of international treaties of the Russian Federation aimed at strengthening 
mutual trust in the field of naval operations; (11) participation as a branch of the Armed Forces of the 
Russian Federation in international peacekeeping operations, including under the auspices of the United 
Nations and in cooperation with international organizations” (Fundamentals of the State Policy of the 
Russian Federation in the Field of Naval Operations for the Period Until 2030, 12–13). 
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activities in certain maritime areas confirm that Russia has not been able to establish the 
necessary border protection system favorable to Russia. 
The RFN is unable to maintain the operational and combat capabilities to secure it 
a position naval leader in the world and has not been able to balance RFN development to 
prevent U.S. naval superiority.  Liv Karin Parnemo, a senior advisor to the Norwegian 
Ministry of Defense, argued in 2019 that Moscow’s grand naval ambitions exist only in 
doctrine and policies, and the reality is that the RFN has been developed predominantly as 
a coastal defense force.274  This characterization is taking into account and recognizing 
that the RFN has indeed increased its presence and operations in areas formerly dominated 
by the U.S. and NATO naval forces (i.e., Mediterranean Sea and Black Sea) but, regardless 
of increase in and expansion of naval activity, Russia is still far from achieving its desired 
naval superiority. According to Parnemo and further emphasized by Richard Connolly, the 
primary security documents/doctrines/policies discussed in this thesis serve the vital 
function of communicating the Russian narrative of emphasizing and identifying the 
central threat to Russia (U.S. and NATO) while also signaling Russia’s strength to 
domestic and international audiences.275  The best way to analyze RFN effectiveness, 
therefore, is to evaluate the official documents against observed operations and allocation 
of naval assets and resources.276   
Based on both GPV-2020 production and assessed projections of GPV-2027, 
Russian leadership has shown favor to the ‘dual-fleet’ concept for the RFN and are 
prioritizing vessels for coastal-defense/green water operations. This prioritization, 
however, was not the ambition of Russian leaders. The maritime and naval policies imply, 
and the Russian definition of strategic deterrence asserts, that all RFN fleets should possess 
blue-water/open-ocean capabilities, but these are not the types of fleets the RFN is putting 
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to sea.277  The Russian leadership had aspirations, by 2020, to fulfill its maritime strategy 
by having a mix of Borei- and Yasen-class SSNs and Lada-class SSs to be deployed 
alongside Buyan-M- and Steregushchy-class FFCs, Admiral Gorshkov- and Admiral 
Grigorovich-class FFGs, and Lider-class destroyers.278  However, as of April 2020, Russia 
has abandoned the Lider-class destroyer (Project 23560) and the expanded Admiral 
Gorshkov-class (Project 22350) production.279  This serves as an example that supports 
the scholarly consensus that Russia’s economic slowdown and enforced fiscal constraints 
have impacted, and will continue to impact, the ability of Russia to build quality platforms 
on time and within budget.280  Russia’s shipbuilding infrastructure is better suited to 
constructing smaller ships, and as Russian leaders are forced to focus on smaller ships with 
universal weapons systems (Kalibr), RFN operations will remain tailored to green-water 
and littoral operations.281   
A critical part of Putin’s domestic success is dependence on a narrative of military 
strength, including being a great naval power to counter the USN and NATO naval 
forces.282  To off-set the imbalance of blue-water capabilities against the United States, 
the RFN will continue to rely on its Northern Fleet-based SSBN and SSGN submarines 
equipped with their most advanced missiles in the Arctic and Atlantic Oceans. This is 
especially true considering that Russia’s newest Kalibr missiles are purported to have 
longer ranges, and therefore, enable the RFN to target and threaten USN surface vessels. 
Parnemo also highlights that RFN submarines and their long-range missiles accomplish the 
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layered-defense, A2/AD, deterrence, and power projection capabilities that minimize 
Russia’s actual need for a blue-water navy while providing, to a degree, the domestic 
message of the RFN as a naval power.283  Yet, the economic constraints and corrupt 
shipbuilding industry will continue to plague Russia, which means that sustained naval 
operations beyond Russia’s shores and contiguous water spaces, will not be something the 
RFN can achieve or even aspire to.284 
Regarding weapons system development and advanced weapons inventory, Russia 
does not have the necessary precision-strike (conventional and nuclear) capabilities to 
counter the full range of U.S./Western targets.285  However, as highlighted by Center for 
Naval Analysis (CNA) senior researcher, Michael Kofman and research analyst Anya 
Loukiannova Fink, Russia’s current understanding of strategic deterrence is crafted first on 
“coercive power of military measures (forceful in character).”286  They further elaborate 
that Russia conducts strategic deterrence measures continuously, from periods of peace and 
in wartime, and will use designated strikes to deter direct aggression or military threats to 
Russian interests, using conventional weapons up to the level of regional warfare, but 
relying on NNSW in large-scale wars.287  To this measure then, the RFN has been able to 
establish naval capability to strike ground targets of a potential enemy with conventional 
as well as nuclear weapons, as intended, but only regionally. It is important to note that 
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Russia’s primary naval weapons compliment the fleet they are putting to sea; smaller 
vessels tailored for regional, green water operations equipped with weapons intended for 
regional conflicts (Table 10). The prioritization and proliferation of small platforms 
equipped with Kalibr missiles, while capable, have decreased the range of actions available 
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Table 10. A Threshold Model of the Deterrence Ladder289 
Phase of 
Deterrence Deterrent Activities 




* Increase of combat readiness of the armed forces 
* Threat to inflict damage on vitally important 
targets with nonnuclear means 
* Conduct of demonstration tests of newest 
weapons systems 
* Increase of non-forceful measures of political, 
economic, information nature 
* Monitoring of the global military-political 
environment 
Military Threat 
* Single use of precision strike on certain types of 
targets 
* Threats to inflict damage on vitally important 
objects with nonnuclear means and nuclear 
weapons 
* Demonstration actions by the armed forces 
Threatened Period 
Adequate Damage 
 Infliction Phase 
* Grouped use of precision strike to inflict damage 
on targets on adversary territory 
* Actions by general purpose forces 
Local War 
* Mass use of precision strike 
* Single and/or grouped use of NSNW on 
adversary forces 
* Demonstration use of nuclear weapons by SNF 
or NSNW 
Regional War 
* Mass use of NSNW on adversary forces 
* Single and/or grouped use of nuclear weapons of 
Strategic Nuclear Forces and/or NSNW on 
military-economic targets of the adversary 
Large-Scale War 




289 Source: Michael Kofman, Anya Fink, and Jeffrey Edmonds, Russian Strategy for Escalation 
Management: Evolution of Key Concepts, DRM-2019-U-022455-1Rev (Arlington, VA: CNA, Corp., April 
2020), 22, https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/DRM-2019-U-022455-1Rev.pdf. “A translation of a 
Russian perspective around 2010 on an intrawar “deterrence ladder,” which aligns the ways and means 
envisioned for managing escalation within the scale of armed conflict where they are likely to be employed. 
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In conclusion, the RFN is not currently in a position, nor are they expected to be in 
the position, to fully implement its prescribed Naval Policy. Given the recent cancellations 
of the RFN’s large surface combatant projects and growing fiscal uncertainty, RFN will 
prioritize small vessel construction, modernize its older platforms, and ensure strategic 
survivability of its crucial submarine force. While the RFN has been unable to attain the 
blue-water surface vessels it desires and that are needed for open ocean conflict, the RFN 
submarine force still remains a credible threat to USN operations and the U.S. homeland. 
The RFN will continue to leverage its advanced missile capabilities to deter adversary 
forces and balance U.S./NATO naval forces in key regional areas. The RFN can be 
expected to continue to train and develop tactical proficiency in contested areas which 
Russia views strategically important. Moreover, fleet and military district level exercises 
will continue to test RFN responses and reactions to a credible adversary navy, such as the 
U.S., NATO naval groups, and even China. The RFN will not achieve the naval superiority 
it desires, but it should be considered an able and determined threat in areas formerly 




APPENDIX. RUSSIAN NAVAL FLEET/FLOTILLA 
COMPOSITION290 
Table 11. Northern Fleet Surface Vessels 
Type Name NATO Name Year Commissioned 
CV Admiral Kuznetzov*** Admiral Kuznetzov 1990 
CGN Admiral Nakhimov*** Kirov 1988 
CGN Pyotr Velikiy Kirov 1998 
CG  Marshal Ustinov Slava 1986 
DDGS Admiral Kulakov Udaloy I 1981 (2010*) 
DDGS Severmorsk Udaloy I 1987 
DDGS Admiral Levchenko Udaloy I 1988 
DDGS Admiral Kharlamov*** Udaloy I 1989 
DDGS Admiral Chabanenko*** Udaloy II 1999 
DDG Admiral Ushakov Sovremennyy 1993 
FFG Gorshkov** Gorshkov 2018 
PGG Aysberg Nanuchka III 1979 
PGG Rassvet Nanuchka III 1988 
FSS Brest Grisha III 1988 
FSS Yunga Grisha III 1989 
FSS Nar`yan-Mar Grisha III 1990 
FSS Onega Grisha III 1990 
FSS Monchegorsk Grisha III 1993 
FSS Snezhnogorsk Grisha III 1994 
LST Iven Gren Iven Gren 2018 
LST Olenegorskiy gornyak Ropucha 1976 
LST Kondopoga Ropucha 1976 
LST Alexandr Otrakovsky Ropucha 1978 
LST Gerogiy Pobedonosets Ropucha II 1985 
*Year Upgraded 
**Kalibr-Missile Capable 
***Vessel in modification layup or awaiting decommission 
  
 
290 Tables in this appendix are adapted from ais.org; russianships.info (updated May 21, 2020), and 
nti.org. 
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Table 12. Northern Fleet Submarines 
Type Name NATO Name Year Commissioned 
SSBN Dmitriy Donskoy Typhoon 1981 
SSBN Dolgorukiy (Borei) Dolgorukiy 2012 
SSBN Verkhoturye Delta IV 1984 
SSBN Ekaterinburg Delta IV 1985 
SSBN Tula Delta IV 1987 
SSBN Bryansk*** Delta IV 1988 
SSBN Kareliya Delta IV 1989 
SSBN Novomoskovsk Delta IV 1990 
SSGN Voronezh Oscar II 1989 
SSGN Smolensk Oscar II 1990 
SSGN Orel Oscar II 1992 
SSGN Severodvinsk (Yasen) Graney 2013 
SSN Pantera Akula I 1990 
SSN Volk Akula I 1991 (2017*) 
SSN Leopard*** Akula I 1992 (2018*) 
SSN Tigr** Akula I 1993 (~2023*) 
SSN Vepr**/*** Akula II  1995 (~2020*) 
SSN Gepard Akula II 2001 
SSN Karp*** Sierra I 1984 
SSN Kostroma Sierra I 1987 
SSN Nizhniy Novgorod Sierra II 1990 
SSN Pskov Sierra II 1993 
SSN Obninsk Victor III 1990 
SSN Daniil Moskovskiy Victor III 1990 
SSN Tambov*** Victor III 1992 
SSA  Sarov Sarov 2008 
SS St. Petersburg Lada 2010 
SS Yaroslavl’*** Kilo 1988 
SS Vladikavkaz Kilo 1990 
SS Magnitogorsk Kilo 1990 
SS Lipetsk Kilo 1991 
SS Kaluga Kilo 1989 
*Year Upgraded 
**Kalibr-Missile Capable 
***Vessel in modification layup or awaiting decommission 
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Table 13. Black Sea Fleet Surface Vessels 
Type Name NATO Name Year Commissioned 
CG Moskva Slava 1982 
FFG Smetlivy Kashin 1969 
FFG Ladny Krivak I 1980 
FFG Pytlivy Krivak II 1981 
FFG Admiral Grigorovich** Grigorovich 2016 
FFG Admiral Essen** Grigorovich 2016 
FFG Admiral Makarov** Grigorovich 2017 
FSS Alexandrovets Grisha I 1982 
FSS Muromets Grisha III 1982 
FSS Suzdalets Grisha III 1983 
FSS Kasimov Grisha III 1986 
FSS Eysk Grisha III 1989 
FSS Povorino Grisha III 1989 
LST Saratov Alligator 1966 
LST Orsk Alligator 1968 
LST Nikolay Filchenkov Alligator 1975 
LST Novocherkassk Ropucha I 1987 
LST Yamal*** Ropucha I 1988 
LST Tsezar Kunikov Ropucha I 1986 
LST Azov Ropucha II 1990 
PGG Burya Tarantul III 1987 
PGG Shuya Tarantul II Mod 1985 
PGG Veter Tarantul III 1990 
PGG Naberezhnye Chelny Tarantul III 1989 
PGG Ivanovets Tarantul III 1989 
PGG Ingushetiya** Sviyazhsk 2019 
PGG Vyshniy Volochek** Sviyazhsk 2018 
PGG Orekhovo-Zuevo** Sviyazhsk 2018 
PGG Mirazh Nanuchka III 1986 
*Year Upgraded 
**Kalibr-Missile Capable 







Table 14. Black Sea Fleet Submarines 
Type Name NATO Name Year Commissioned 
SS Alrosa*** Kilo 1990 
SS Novorossiysk** Improved Kilo 2014 
SS Rostov-on-Don** Improved Kilo 2014 
SS Stary Oskol** Improved Kilo 2015 
SS Krasnodar** Improved Kilo 2015 
SS Velikiy Novgorod** Improved Kilo 2016 
SS Kolpino** Improved Kilo 2016 
*Year Upgraded 
**Kalibr-Missile Capable 































Table 15. Baltic Sea Fleet Surface Vessels 
Type Name NATO Name Year Commissioned 
DDG Nastoychivyy Sovremenny  1992 
FFC Steregushchy Steregushchy 2007 
FFC Soobrazitelnyy Steregushchy 2011 
FFC Boykiy Steregushchy 2013 
FFC Stoykiy Steregushchy 2014 
FFG Neustrashimy Neustrashimy 1990 
FFG Yaroslav Mudry*** Neustrashimy 2009 
FFS MPK-192 Parchim 1986 
FFS Kazanets Parchim 1987 
FFS Zelenodolsk Parchim 1987 
FFS Aleksin*** Parchim 1989 
FFS Kabardino-Balkaria Parchim 1989 
FFS Kalmykiya Parchim 1990 
PGG Sovetsk** Karakut 2018 
PGG Mytischi** Karakut 2018 
PGG Zyb` Nanuchka III 1989 
PGG Geyzer Nanuchka III 1989 
PGG Passat Nanuchka III 1990 
PGG Liven` Nanuchka III 1991 
PGG Zeleny Dol Buyan-M 2015 
PGG Serpukhov Buyan-M 2015 
PGM Kuznetsk Tarantul 1985 
PGM R-257 Tarantul 1986 
PGM Zarechny Tarantul 1989 
PGM Dimitrovograd Tarantul 1991 
PGM Morshansk Tarantul 1992 
PGM Chuvashiya Tarantul 2000 
LST Minsk Ropucha II 1983 
LST Kaliningrad Ropucha II 1984 
LST Alexandr Shabalin Ropucha II 1985 
LST Korolev Ropucha II 1991 
*Year Upgraded 
**Kalibr-Missile Capable 





Table 16. Baltic Sea Fleet Submarines 
Type Name NATO Name Year Commissioned 
SS Dmitrov Kilo 1986 
 
 
Table 17. Caspian Sea Flotilla Surface Vessels 
Type Name NATO Name Year Commissioned 
FFG Tatarstan** Gepard 2003 
FFG Dagestan** Gepard 2012 
PGG Grad Sviyazhsk** Sviyazhsk 2013 
PGG Uglich** Sviyazhsk 2013 
PGG Velikiy Ustyug** Sviyazhsk 2014 
FS Astrakhan Buyan 2006 
FS Volgodonsk Buyan 2011 
FS Makhachkala Buyan 2012 
PGM Stupinets Tarantul 1985 
*Year Upgraded 
**Kalibr-Missile Capable 























Table 18. Pacific Fleet Surface Vessels 
Type Name NATO Name Year Commissioned 
CG Varyag Slava 1989 
DDGS Shaposhnikov*** Udaloy I 1985 
DDGS Admiral Tributs Udaloy I 1986 
DDGS Admiral Vinogradiv Udaloy I 1988 
DDGS Admiral Panteleev Udaloy I 1991 
DDG  Burnyy*** Sovremenny  1988 
DDG Bystryy Sovremenny  1989 
FFC Gromkyy Steregushchy 2018 
FFC Sovershennyy Steregushchy 2017 
PGG Smerch Nanuchka IV 1984 
PGG Iney Nanuchka IV 1987 
PGG Moroz Nanuchka IV 1989 
PGG Razliv Nanuchka IV 1991 
FSS Kholmsk Grisha II 1985 
FSS MPK-221 Grisha II 1987 
FSS Koreets Grisha II 1989 
FSS Sovetskaya Gavan` Grisha II 1990 
FSS MPK-107 Grisha II 1990 
FSS Metel` Grisha II 1990 
FSS MPK-82 Grisha II 1991 
FSS Ust`-Ilimsk Grisha II 1991 
PGM R-79 Tarantul 1984 
PGM R-261 Tarantul 1988 
PGM R-297 Tarantul 1990 
PGM R-298 Tarantul 1990 
PGM R-11 Tarantul 1991 
PGM R-14 Tarantul 1991 
PGM R-18 Tarantul 1992 
PGM R-19 Tarantul 1992 
PGM R-20 Tarantul 1993 
PGM R-24 Tarantul 1994 
PGM R-29 Tarantul 2003 
LST Oslyabya Ropucha 1981 
LST Admiral Nevelskoy Ropucha 1982 
LST Peresvet Ropucha 1991 
LST Nikolay Vilkov Ropucha 1974 
*Year Upgraded 
**Kalibr-Missile Capable 
***Vessel in modification layup or awaiting decommission 
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Table 19. Pacific Fleet Submarines 
Type Name NATO Name Year Commissioned 
SSBN Ryazan` Delta III 1982 
SSBN Alexandr Nevskiy Dolgorukiy 2013 
SSBN Vladimir Monomakh Dolgorukiy 2014 
SSGN Irkutsk*** Oscar II 1988 
SSGN Chelyabinsk*** Oscar II 1990 
SSGN Tver Oscar II 1992 
SSGN Omsk Oscar II 1993 
SSGN Tomsk Oscar II 1996 
SSN Bratsk*** Akula 1989 
SSN Magadan Akula 1990 
SSN Kuzbass Akula 1992 
SSN Samara Akula 1995 
SS Chita Kilo 1981 
SS Chudotvorets Kilo 1988 
SS Nurlat*** Kilo 1988 
SS Ust-Kamchatsk Kilo 1990 
SS Ust-Bolsheretsk Kilo 1990 
SS Komsomolsk-on-Amur Kilo 1991 
SS Krasnokamensk Kilo 1992 
SS Mogocha Kilo 1994 
SS Kamchatsky Kilo 2019 
*Year Upgraded 
**Kalibr-Missile Capable 
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